In this scenario, the router has multiple entries for the same destination network (192.168.1.0/24) with different next-hop addresses and associated metrics. The principle that governs the selection of the next-hop address is the “lowest metric” rule. This means that the router will choose the route with the smallest metric value, as it is considered the most efficient path to reach the destination. Here, the metrics for the routes are as follows: – 10.0.0.1 has a metric of 10 – 10.0.0.2 has a metric of 20 – 10.0.0.3 has a metric of 15 – 10.0.0.4 has a metric of 5 Among these, the route via 10.0.0.4 has the lowest metric of 5, making it the preferred choice for forwarding the packet to the destination 192.168.1.10. This decision is crucial for optimizing network performance, as it ensures that packets take the most efficient path, reducing latency and improving overall throughput. Understanding how routing tables and metrics work is essential for network administrators, as it directly impacts the efficiency and reliability of data transmission across the network.

Upon receiving the request, the DHCP server processes it and sends back a DHCP Offer message. The relay agent receives this unicast response and then broadcasts it back to the original client. This process ensures that clients can obtain IP addresses even when the DHCP server is not on the same local network segment. The relay agent operates at Layer 3 of the OSI model, specifically handling the transport of DHCP messages across different subnets. It does not assign IP addresses directly; that responsibility lies with the DHCP server. Additionally, it does not block requests or convert protocols, as its role is strictly to relay messages. This functionality is crucial in larger networks where multiple subnets exist, allowing for centralized DHCP management while maintaining efficient communication across the network. Understanding this process is essential for network administrators to ensure proper IP address allocation and network configuration.

If the client disconnects from the network at 2:00 PM and reconnects at 3:00 PM, the DHCP server will check the lease status for the IP address that was assigned. Since the lease is still valid (it has not expired yet), the client will typically receive the same IP address upon reconnection. DHCP servers often maintain a record of active leases, and as long as the lease is still active, the server will attempt to reassign the same IP address to the client when it reconnects. However, if the lease had expired (which it has not in this case), the client would have to request a new IP address, and it might receive a different one if the previous address was reassigned to another client. In summary, the lease duration and the behavior of the DHCP server regarding lease renewal and reassignment are critical concepts in understanding DHCP operation and configuration. This scenario illustrates the importance of lease management in DHCP, ensuring that clients can maintain connectivity without interruption as long as their leases are valid.

Given that the lease time is set to 24 hours, this means that each assigned IP address will be reserved for the client for that duration. After 12 hours, which is half of the lease time, the DHCP server will still hold the leases for the 30 clients that have been assigned IP addresses. However, since the lease time is only halfway expired, these 30 IP addresses are still considered in use and cannot be reassigned to new clients. Now, we need to calculate the total number of IP addresses available for new clients. Initially, there are 101 total IP addresses. Since 30 clients are currently using IP addresses, we subtract these from the total: \[ \text{Available IP addresses} = \text{Total IP addresses} – \text{Assigned IP addresses} = 101 – 30 = 71 \] However, since the lease time is only halfway expired, the 30 IP addresses remain occupied. Therefore, no new clients can be assigned IP addresses until the lease time for those clients expires completely. Thus, the number of available IP addresses for new clients remains at 71, but since the question asks how many IP addresses will be available for new clients after 12 hours, we must consider that the 30 clients still hold their leases. Therefore, after 12 hours, the DHCP server will still have 71 IP addresses in total, but since the leases for the 30 clients are still active, the number of IP addresses available for new clients is effectively: \[ \text{Available IP addresses for new clients} = 101 – 30 = 71 \] However, since the question specifies that the DHCP server can handle a maximum of 50 clients simultaneously, and 30 clients are currently using addresses, the remaining available IP addresses for new clients would be: \[ \text{Available IP addresses for new clients} = 50 – 30 = 20 \] Thus, after 12 hours, there will be 20 IP addresses available for new clients, as the remaining leases will not expire until the full 24 hours have elapsed. This scenario illustrates the importance of understanding DHCP lease times and how they affect IP address availability in a network.

Using a Layer 2 switch with trunk links (as suggested in option b) would not provide the necessary routing capabilities, as Layer 2 switches do not perform routing functions. Relying solely on VLAN tagging would not enforce the required security measures, as devices in VLAN 30 could still potentially access VLANs 10 and 20. Implementing private VLANs (PVLANs) (option c) could isolate VLAN 30 from VLANs 10 and 20, but it is a more complex solution that may not be necessary given the requirement for inter-VLAN communication. Additionally, PVLANs are typically used in scenarios where there is a need for multiple isolated subnets within the same VLAN, which is not the case here. Setting up a single VLAN for all departments (option d) would defeat the purpose of segmentation and would not provide the necessary isolation or security. Port security would only limit access based on MAC addresses and would not prevent VLAN 30 from accessing VLANs 10 and 20. In summary, the optimal approach involves using a Layer 3 switch for inter-VLAN routing combined with ACLs to enforce the required communication and security policies effectively. This configuration ensures that the network remains organized, secure, and efficient, allowing for proper traffic management between the different departments.

Option b, using a router with subinterfaces, is a valid method for inter-VLAN routing but introduces additional complexity and potential latency due to the need for traffic to traverse a Layer 2 switch before reaching the router. This can lead to increased broadcast traffic as well, as all VLAN traffic must be sent to the router for inter-VLAN communication. Option c, implementing a single VLAN for all departments, would negate the benefits of VLAN segmentation, such as improved security and reduced broadcast domains. This approach would lead to increased broadcast traffic and potential security risks, as all devices would be on the same network segment. Option d, setting up a dedicated physical router for each VLAN, is not practical in most environments due to cost and complexity. This would require multiple physical devices and would not scale well as the network grows. In summary, the optimal solution is to utilize a Layer 3 switch with SVIs, as it provides efficient inter-VLAN routing while maintaining the benefits of VLAN segmentation and minimizing broadcast traffic.

In contrast, Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) provides virtualized computing resources over the internet, which gives users more control over the infrastructure but requires them to manage everything from the operating system up. This model is more suited for organizations that need to customize their infrastructure or run legacy applications that require specific configurations. Software as a Service (SaaS) delivers software applications over the internet on a subscription basis, where users access the software via a web browser. While this model reduces the need for local installation and maintenance, it does not provide the flexibility and control needed for custom application development. Function as a Service (FaaS) is a serverless computing model that allows developers to run code in response to events without managing servers. While it can be beneficial for specific use cases, it may not provide the comprehensive development environment that the company requires for building and scaling applications. Given the company’s need for a development-focused environment with minimal infrastructure management, PaaS is the most suitable option. It allows for rapid development, easy scaling, and a focus on coding and testing, aligning perfectly with the company’s objectives.

When applications are deployed in a single availability zone, they become vulnerable to any disruptions that affect that zone. This approach can lead to significant downtime if a failure occurs, which is detrimental to business continuity. On the other hand, a multi-cloud strategy, while it may provide some level of redundancy, does not inherently ensure that applications are resilient against failures within a specific cloud provider’s infrastructure. Additionally, relying solely on automated backups does not address the immediate need for application availability during a disaster; backups are typically used for data recovery rather than maintaining operational continuity. To effectively implement high availability, the company should also consider load balancing across availability zones and implementing health checks to ensure that traffic is directed only to healthy instances. Furthermore, they should evaluate the cloud provider’s service level agreements (SLAs) regarding uptime and availability to ensure that their design aligns with business requirements. Overall, the best practice is to leverage the cloud’s inherent capabilities by utilizing multiple availability zones to enhance resilience and minimize downtime during disaster recovery scenarios.

Regularly updating device firmware is equally crucial, as it addresses known vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers. Many IoT devices are susceptible to security flaws that manufacturers often patch through firmware updates. By ensuring that these updates are applied promptly, organizations can mitigate risks associated with outdated software. In contrast, relying on default passwords is a common pitfall that can lead to unauthorized access, as many users neglect to change these credentials. Disabling remote access entirely may enhance security but can also hinder user convenience and functionality, leading to potential dissatisfaction. Lastly, using a single complex password for all devices, while seemingly secure, poses a significant risk; if that password is compromised, all devices become vulnerable. Thus, a comprehensive security strategy that includes strong authentication, regular updates, and adherence to industry standards is essential for safeguarding IoT devices in a smart home environment.

The private IP address ranges defined by RFC 1918 include: – 10.0.0.0 to 10.255.255.255 (Class A) – 172.16.0.0 to 172.31.255.255 (Class B) – 192.168.0.0 to 192.168.255.255 (Class C) When subnetting, the formula to calculate the number of usable IP addresses in a subnet is given by: $$ \text{Usable IPs} = 2^{(32 – \text{prefix length})} – 2 $$ The subtraction of 2 accounts for the network and broadcast addresses, which cannot be assigned to hosts. 1. **Option a: 192.168.1.0/26** – The prefix length of /26 means there are $2^{(32 – 26)} = 2^6 = 64$ total addresses. After subtracting 2 for the network and broadcast addresses, there are 62 usable addresses. This option can accommodate the 50 devices and allows for future expansion. 2. **Option b: 10.0.0.0/30** – A /30 subnet provides $2^{(32 – 30)} = 2^2 = 4$ total addresses, resulting in 2 usable addresses. This is insufficient for the requirement of 50 devices. 3. **Option c: 172.16.0.0/28** – A /28 subnet yields $2^{(32 – 28)} = 2^4 = 16$ total addresses, which results in 14 usable addresses. This is also inadequate for the 50 devices. 4. **Option d: 192.168.0.0/29** – A /29 subnet provides $2^{(32 – 29)} = 2^3 = 8$ total addresses, leading to 6 usable addresses. This option is far too small for the requirement. In conclusion, the only option that meets the requirement of accommodating 50 devices while allowing for future growth is the subnetting option of 192.168.1.0/26, as it provides sufficient usable addresses and adheres to the guidelines for private IP addressing.

The flow table is not static; it is updated in real-time based on network conditions and traffic patterns. This allows the SDN controller to adapt to changing network demands, optimize resource utilization, and improve overall network performance. For instance, if a particular path becomes congested, the controller can dynamically adjust the flow table to reroute traffic through less congested paths, thereby enhancing throughput and reducing latency. In contrast, the other options present misconceptions about the flow table’s role. A static configuration file does not reflect the dynamic nature of SDN, as it fails to adapt to real-time changes. Similarly, using the flow table solely for logging purposes undermines its primary function of actively managing data flows. Lastly, describing the flow table as a backup mechanism misrepresents its proactive role in directing traffic rather than merely serving as a failover solution. Thus, understanding the flow table’s purpose is essential for effectively leveraging SDN technology in optimizing network performance.

Restarting the local workstation may resolve some issues, but it is not a proactive approach to diagnosing network connectivity problems, especially when the issue appears to be at the router level. Changing DNS settings is also not relevant in this case, as the traceroute indicates that the packets are not reaching their destination, which suggests a routing or connectivity issue rather than a name resolution problem. Increasing the MTU size could potentially help with fragmentation issues, but it is not the first step in diagnosing connectivity problems, especially when the immediate evidence points to the router’s interface. Thus, the most logical and effective first action is to check the router’s interface status and any associated error messages or configurations. This approach aligns with best practices in network troubleshooting, which emphasize starting from the point of failure and working backward to identify the root cause of the issue.

Additionally, the switch will generate a log entry for the violation, which can be useful for monitoring and auditing purposes. This configuration allows for a balance between security and network availability, as it prevents unauthorized access while maintaining service for legitimate users. In contrast, if the violation mode were set to “shutdown,” the port would go into an error-disabled state, effectively cutting off all traffic until manually re-enabled. Understanding the implications of different violation modes is crucial for network administrators to effectively manage security policies without disrupting legitimate network operations.

Increasing bandwidth may seem like a viable solution, but it does not address the underlying issue of traffic management. Attackers can easily scale their attacks to match or exceed the increased bandwidth, rendering this approach ineffective. Similarly, deploying a single firewall at the network perimeter lacks the necessary depth of defense; firewalls can be bypassed or overwhelmed by sophisticated DDoS attacks, especially if they are not configured to handle high volumes of traffic. Relying solely on an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is also insufficient, as IDS primarily focuses on monitoring and alerting rather than actively mitigating threats. While it can provide valuable insights into unusual traffic patterns, it does not prevent attacks from occurring. In conclusion, implementing rate limiting is a critical component of a comprehensive DDoS mitigation strategy, as it allows for the management of incoming traffic while ensuring that legitimate users can still access services without disruption. This approach, combined with other security measures such as firewalls and IDS, creates a robust defense against potential DDoS threats.

Given this understanding, the institution should consider risk mitigation strategies such as diversification, which involves spreading investments across various asset classes to reduce exposure to any single asset’s volatility. This approach can help cushion against potential losses, particularly in high-risk assets. The incorrect options present common misconceptions about VaR. For instance, it is not a guarantee of loss, nor does it suggest that the institution should liquidate its assets or invest more heavily in derivatives without a thorough analysis of the associated risks. Furthermore, while VaR does have limitations, particularly in extreme market conditions, it remains a valuable tool for risk assessment and should not be disregarded outright. In summary, the institution’s approach should be informed by the VaR calculation, leading to a strategic review of its investment portfolio and consideration of diversification as a key risk management tactic.

To troubleshoot this issue, the administrator should first analyze the network traffic patterns to identify any signs of congestion. This can be done by examining the bandwidth utilization on the network interfaces and checking for any spikes in traffic that coincide with the retransmissions. Additionally, the administrator should look at the round-trip time (RTT) of the TCP packets, as increased RTT can also indicate congestion. While incorrect MTU settings can lead to fragmentation issues, they typically manifest as dropped packets during the handshake phase rather than after it. Firewall rules could potentially block packets, but this would likely result in connection failures rather than retransmissions. Misconfigured DNS settings would affect name resolution but would not directly cause TCP retransmissions. In summary, the most plausible explanation for the observed behavior is network congestion, and the administrator should focus on monitoring network traffic and performance metrics to identify and resolve the underlying congestion issues. This approach aligns with best practices in network troubleshooting, which emphasize the importance of analyzing traffic patterns and performance metrics to diagnose connectivity problems effectively.

When using TCP, the overhead is generally higher compared to other protocols like UDP because of the additional features it provides. For instance, TCP establishes a connection through a three-way handshake process before data transmission begins, which adds latency but ensures that both ends are ready for communication. Furthermore, TCP segments the data into packets, assigns sequence numbers, and requires acknowledgment from the receiving end, which ensures that all packets are received in the correct order and allows for retransmission of any lost packets. On the other hand, UDP, which is also a transport layer protocol, does not guarantee delivery, order, or error correction, making it unsuitable for applications that require reliable communication. ICMP is primarily used for diagnostic and control purposes, such as pinging a device, and does not provide data transmission services. FTP, while it operates at a higher layer (application layer), relies on TCP for its transport, thus inheriting the same reliability features. In summary, TCP is the most appropriate choice for applications requiring reliable data transmission due to its robust error-checking and ordering capabilities, despite the increased overhead associated with these features. Understanding the trade-offs between reliability and performance is crucial when selecting the appropriate protocol for specific applications in network design.

Starting with the number of required subnets, we can use the formula for calculating the number of subnets created by a subnet mask: $$ \text{Number of Subnets} = 2^n $$ where \( n \) is the number of bits borrowed from the host portion of the address. To accommodate at least 5 subnets, we need to find the smallest \( n \) such that: $$ 2^n \geq 5 $$ Calculating this, we find that \( n = 3 \) (since \( 2^3 = 8 \), which is sufficient). This means we will borrow 3 bits from the host portion of the original /24 subnet mask, resulting in a new subnet mask of /27 (or 255.255.255.224). Next, we need to ensure that each subnet can support at least 30 hosts. The formula for calculating the number of usable hosts in a subnet is: $$ \text{Usable Hosts} = 2^{(32 – \text{Subnet Bits})} – 2 $$ The subtraction of 2 accounts for the network and broadcast addresses. For a /27 subnet mask, we have: $$ \text{Usable Hosts} = 2^{(32 – 27)} – 2 = 2^5 – 2 = 32 – 2 = 30 $$ Thus, each subnet will provide exactly 30 usable IP addresses, which meets the company’s requirement. In contrast, the other options do not meet both criteria: – A /26 subnet mask (255.255.255.192) provides 62 usable hosts but only allows for 4 subnets. – A /28 subnet mask (255.255.255.240) provides only 14 usable hosts, which is insufficient. – A /29 subnet mask (255.255.255.248) provides only 6 usable hosts, also insufficient. Therefore, the correct subnet mask that meets both the subnet and host requirements is 255.255.255.224, providing 30 usable IP addresses per subnet.

\[ \text{Total Packet Size} = \text{Data Payload} + \text{Header} + \text{Trailer} = 1500 \text{ bytes} + 20 \text{ bytes} + 4 \text{ bytes} = 1524 \text{ bytes} \] When the packet reaches the destination device, the decapsulation process occurs. This involves removing the header and trailer from the received packet. The size of the data payload after decapsulation is calculated by subtracting the sizes of the header and trailer from the total packet size: \[ \text{Data Payload After Decapsulation} = \text{Total Packet Size} – \text{Header} – \text{Trailer} = 1524 \text{ bytes} – 20 \text{ bytes} – 4 \text{ bytes} = 1500 \text{ bytes} \] Thus, after decapsulation, the size of the data payload remains 1500 bytes, which is the original size before encapsulation. This process illustrates the fundamental principles of encapsulation and decapsulation in networking, where data is prepared for transmission by adding necessary control information (header and trailer) and then restored to its original form at the destination. Understanding these processes is crucial for network professionals, as they form the basis for data communication protocols and the functioning of various network layers.

In contrast, relying on a static list of devices and users (option b) can lead to significant challenges as the network evolves. This approach lacks flexibility and can quickly become outdated, making it difficult to enforce compliance effectively. Similarly, depending solely on endpoint security software (option c) fails to provide a comprehensive view of the network’s security posture, as it does not integrate with the centralized policy server, leading to potential gaps in policy enforcement. Lastly, creating a single, universal policy (option d) disregards the unique requirements of different user roles and device types. Such a one-size-fits-all approach can lead to either overly restrictive access for some users or insufficient security for others, ultimately undermining the effectiveness of the policy management system. By implementing RBAC, the network administrator can ensure that the policy management system is both effective in enforcing security standards and scalable to accommodate future growth and changes in the network environment. This approach aligns with best practices in network security management, emphasizing the importance of adaptability and specificity in policy enforcement.

The Local Preference attribute is crucial in determining the preferred path for outbound traffic within an AS. A higher Local Preference value indicates a more preferred route. In this case, the Local Preference is set to 150, which is relatively high and would typically lead to this route being favored over others with lower Local Preference values. The Next Hop attribute specifies the IP address of the next router to which packets should be sent. While the Next Hop must be reachable for the route to be valid, it does not directly influence the preference of the route itself in terms of selection criteria. Considering these attributes collectively, the route with the given AS Path and Local Preference will be preferred over others with longer AS Paths or lower Local Preference values. This preference leads to optimal traffic flow, as the organization can effectively manage its routing decisions to ensure efficient data transmission across its network. Thus, understanding the interplay of these attributes is essential for network administrators to optimize routing performance and maintain robust connectivity in multi-homed environments.

In this scenario, Route 1 has an AS-path of three ASes (65001, 65002, 65003), while Route 2 also has an AS-path of three ASes (65004, 65002, 65003). At first glance, they appear to be equal in length. However, the BGP decision process also considers the specific AS numbers in the path. BGP prefers paths that originate from the local AS or paths that have fewer ASes that are not part of the local AS. In this case, if we assume that the local AS is 65002, Route 1 is preferred because it includes AS 65001, which is a direct connection to the local AS, while Route 2 includes AS 65004, which is further away. Additionally, if there are any policies or configurations that favor certain ASes over others, those would also come into play. Thus, the correct choice is to prefer Route 1 due to its shorter effective distance to the local AS and the implications of the AS-path attributes in the BGP decision-making process. This understanding of BGP’s path vector protocol and its decision criteria is crucial for network engineers to ensure efficient and loop-free routing in complex multi-provider environments.

The most plausible explanation for the connectivity problem is that the remote server’s firewall is configured to block ICMP packets, which are used by both `ping` and `traceroute`. Firewalls often have rules that restrict certain types of traffic for security reasons, and ICMP is commonly filtered to prevent ping sweeps or other reconnaissance activities. If the firewall is set to drop ICMP packets, the server would not respond to the `ping` requests, resulting in timeouts, and it would also not respond to the `traceroute` packets that rely on ICMP Time Exceeded messages to report back the path taken. While the other options present potential issues, they are less likely given the evidence provided by the `traceroute` output. A misconfigured VPN tunnel could lead to complete connectivity loss, not just ICMP issues, and a local routing issue would likely prevent packets from reaching the last hop altogether. Lastly, while software bugs can occur, they are less common than configuration issues, especially in a well-maintained environment. Thus, the most logical conclusion is that the remote server’s firewall is the root cause of the connectivity issue.

Increasing bandwidth, while seemingly beneficial, does not address the core issue of malicious traffic overwhelming the system. Attackers can easily scale their attacks to match or exceed any bandwidth increase, rendering this approach ineffective. Similarly, deploying a simple access control list (ACL) that restricts traffic to known IP addresses can lead to significant issues, as it may block legitimate users who are accessing the services from dynamic or changing IP addresses. This approach can create accessibility problems and does not provide a comprehensive solution to DDoS threats. Lastly, establishing a single point of failure in the architecture is counterproductive. While it may reduce management complexity and costs, it creates a vulnerability that can be easily exploited by attackers, leading to complete service outages. Therefore, the most effective strategy is to implement a WAF, which provides a balanced approach to filtering malicious traffic while allowing legitimate users to access the services seamlessly. This aligns with best practices in cybersecurity, emphasizing the importance of layered defenses and proactive threat management.

This means that users in different VLANs may experience inconsistent connectivity to the internet. If a user attempts to access an external resource, the Layer 3 switch will look for a matching route in its routing table. If none exists, the packet will be dropped, leading to intermittent connectivity issues. This situation is exacerbated in a VLAN environment where inter-VLAN routing is necessary for communication between different segments of the network. Furthermore, the misconception that static routes alone can handle all routing needs without a default route is common. Static routes are indeed prioritized, but they do not replace the need for a default route, which serves as a catch-all for any traffic not explicitly defined. The Layer 3 switch will not automatically create a default route based on existing static routes; this must be configured manually by the network administrator. Lastly, the idea that users can only access the internet if they are on the same VLAN as the Layer 3 switch is incorrect. Properly configured inter-VLAN routing should allow users from different VLANs to communicate with external networks, provided that the routing is set up correctly. Thus, the absence of a default route is the primary reason for the connectivity issues experienced by users across the network.

This means that users in different VLANs may experience inconsistent connectivity to the internet. If a user attempts to access an external resource, the Layer 3 switch will look for a matching route in its routing table. If none exists, the packet will be dropped, leading to intermittent connectivity issues. This situation is exacerbated in a VLAN environment where inter-VLAN routing is necessary for communication between different segments of the network. Furthermore, the misconception that static routes alone can handle all routing needs without a default route is common. Static routes are indeed prioritized, but they do not replace the need for a default route, which serves as a catch-all for any traffic not explicitly defined. The Layer 3 switch will not automatically create a default route based on existing static routes; this must be configured manually by the network administrator. Lastly, the idea that users can only access the internet if they are on the same VLAN as the Layer 3 switch is incorrect. Properly configured inter-VLAN routing should allow users from different VLANs to communicate with external networks, provided that the routing is set up correctly. Thus, the absence of a default route is the primary reason for the connectivity issues experienced by users across the network.

In the VTP Server mode, a switch can create, modify, and delete VLANs for the entire VTP domain. This mode is essential for the switch that is responsible for managing VLANs, as it allows the switch to propagate VLAN information to other switches configured as VTP Clients. VTP Clients can receive VLAN updates from VTP Servers but cannot create or modify VLANs themselves. This ensures a centralized management approach, reducing the risk of configuration inconsistencies across the network. On the other hand, VTP Transparent mode allows a switch to forward VTP advertisements but does not participate in the VTP domain itself. This means that while it can pass along VLAN information, it cannot create or manage VLANs, making it unsuitable for the switch tasked with VLAN management. Lastly, VTP Off mode disables VTP on the switch entirely, preventing any VLAN information from being sent or received. Given the requirement for the switch to create and manage VLANs while allowing other switches to receive updates, the VTP Server mode is the most appropriate choice. This configuration not only facilitates effective VLAN management but also enhances network security and segmentation by ensuring that VLAN configurations are consistently applied across the network. Understanding the roles and capabilities of each VTP mode is crucial for network engineers to effectively manage VLANs and maintain a secure and efficient network environment.

Starting with the requirement for subnets, we can use the formula for calculating the number of subnets, which is given by \(2^n\), where \(n\) is the number of bits borrowed from the host portion of the address. To accommodate at least 6 subnets, we need to find the smallest \(n\) such that \(2^n \geq 6\). The smallest \(n\) that satisfies this condition is \(3\) because \(2^3 = 8\), which provides enough subnets. Next, we need to calculate the number of host addresses available in each subnet. The total number of addresses in a subnet is given by \(2^h\), where \(h\) is the number of bits remaining for hosts. The original subnet mask for the 192.168.1.0/24 network allows for 256 total addresses (from 0 to 255). By borrowing 3 bits for subnetting, we have \(24 + 3 = 27\) bits for the subnet mask, which translates to a subnet mask of 255.255.255.224 (/27). Now, we calculate the number of usable IP addresses per subnet. The formula for usable addresses is \(2^h – 2\) (subtracting 2 for the network and broadcast addresses). With a /27 subnet mask, we have \(32 – 27 = 5\) bits remaining for hosts, which gives us \(2^5 = 32\) total addresses. Thus, the number of usable addresses is \(32 – 2 = 30\). In summary, the correct subnet mask is 255.255.255.224, which allows for 30 usable IP addresses per subnet, meeting the company’s requirements for both the number of subnets and the number of hosts per subnet.

In contrast, allowing all team members to make changes without oversight can lead to configuration drift, where devices have inconsistent settings that can complicate management and troubleshooting. Relying solely on manual backups is also problematic; while it may seem simpler, it introduces the risk of human error and may not provide timely recovery options in the event of a failure. Automated backups, on the other hand, ensure that the latest configurations are always saved and can be restored quickly. Disabling logging features to improve performance is a misguided approach. Logging is essential for monitoring changes, diagnosing issues, and maintaining security. Without logs, the administrator would lack visibility into the network’s operational state, making it difficult to identify and resolve problems effectively. In summary, a robust change control process, combined with automated backups and active logging, forms the backbone of an effective configuration management strategy, ensuring that the network remains stable, secure, and compliant with organizational policies.

A Class C network has a default subnet mask of 255.255.255.0, which provides 256 total addresses (from 0 to 255). However, two addresses are reserved: one for the network address and one for the broadcast address. This leaves us with 254 usable addresses. To increase the number of usable addresses, we can borrow bits from the host portion. The formula for calculating the number of usable addresses based on the number of borrowed bits \( n \) is given by: \[ \text{Usable Addresses} = 2^n – 2 \] where \( n \) is the number of bits borrowed. We need at least 500 usable addresses, so we set up the inequality: \[ 2^n – 2 \geq 500 \] Solving for \( n \): 1. Start with \( 2^n \geq 502 \). 2. Calculate \( n \): – \( n = 9 \) gives \( 2^9 = 512 \), which is sufficient. – \( n = 8 \) gives \( 2^8 = 256 \), which is insufficient. Thus, we need to borrow 9 bits from the host portion. Since a Class C network has 8 bits for hosts, borrowing 9 bits is not possible. Therefore, we need to consider the next higher class, which is Class B. If we were to use a Class B network (with a default subnet mask of 255.255.0.0), we would have 16 bits for hosts. Borrowing 9 bits from the host portion would leave us with 7 bits for hosts: \[ 2^7 – 2 = 128 – 2 = 126 \text{ usable addresses} \] This is still insufficient. Therefore, we need to borrow more bits. If we borrow 2 bits from the host portion of a Class C network, the new subnet mask would be 255.255.255.252, which provides: \[ 2^2 – 2 = 2 \text{ usable addresses} \] If we borrow 3 bits, the new subnet mask would be 255.255.255.248, providing: \[ 2^3 – 2 = 6 \text{ usable addresses} \] If we borrow 4 bits, the new subnet mask would be 255.255.255.240, providing: \[ 2^4 – 2 = 14 \text{ usable addresses} \] If we borrow 5 bits, the new subnet mask would be 255.255.255.224, providing: \[ 2^5 – 2 = 30 \text{ usable addresses} \] None of these options provide the required 500 usable addresses. Therefore, the engineer must consider a Class B network with a subnet mask of 255.255.255.0 and borrow 9 bits, which is not listed in the options. In conclusion, the correct answer is that 2 bits must be borrowed from the host portion of a Class C network to achieve the maximum usable addresses, resulting in a new subnet mask of 255.255.255.252.