The question probes the auditor’s understanding of how to assess the effectiveness of a safety culture element related to the “Adaptability and Flexibility” behavioral competency within an ISO 26262 context. Specifically, it targets the auditor’s ability to discern the most appropriate method for evaluating how an organization handles changing safety priorities and embraces new methodologies.

When assessing adaptability and flexibility in the context of ISO 26262, an internal auditor must go beyond simply asking if changes are accommodated. The standard emphasizes a proactive and systematic approach to functional safety. Therefore, the auditor needs to observe how these changes are integrated into the safety lifecycle, how the impact on existing safety goals and ASIL levels is analyzed, and how new or revised safety concepts are adopted.

Option A correctly identifies that the auditor should examine documented procedures for change management, review records of deviations and their resolutions, and interview personnel to understand their practical application of these processes. This approach directly addresses the need to verify the systematic implementation of adaptability and the integration of new methodologies, aligning with the principles of a robust functional safety management system. It allows the auditor to gather evidence of both the intent and the actual execution of these competencies.

Option B, focusing solely on the presence of a “lessons learned” repository, is insufficient. While lessons learned are valuable, they are a retrospective tool and do not directly demonstrate how current changes are managed or how new methodologies are integrated in real-time.

Option C, which suggests evaluating the number of successful cross-functional team projects, is too broad. While teamwork is important, it doesn’t specifically measure the organization’s adaptability to changing safety priorities or its openness to new safety methodologies as required by ISO 26262.

Option D, proposing an assessment of employee satisfaction surveys related to workplace flexibility, is tangential. Employee satisfaction is a factor, but it does not directly correlate with the systematic and rigorous application of functional safety principles in response to evolving safety requirements or technological advancements. The focus must remain on the effectiveness of safety processes and the integration of safety culture elements into the development lifecycle.

The question probes the auditor’s understanding of how to assess an organization’s commitment to functional safety culture, specifically concerning the management of deviations from planned processes. ISO 26262:2018, particularly Part 2 (Management of Functional Safety) and Part 6 (Product Development at the Software Level), emphasizes the importance of a robust safety culture and the systematic handling of non-conformities. An internal auditor’s role is to verify that processes are not only documented but also effectively implemented and that deviations are managed transparently and constructively, fostering continuous improvement.

When evaluating a functional safety management system, an auditor looks for evidence of how the organization handles situations where actual practices diverge from documented procedures. This includes identifying if such deviations are treated as learning opportunities or as mere compliance failures. A strong safety culture, as advocated by ISO 26262, encourages reporting of issues, including deviations, without fear of reprisal, and ensures that these deviations are analyzed to understand their root causes and implement corrective actions. The effectiveness of the corrective actions and the subsequent verification of their implementation are crucial.

Considering the options:
– Option 1 focuses on the proactive identification and correction of deviations, emphasizing root cause analysis and the verification of effectiveness. This aligns directly with the principles of continuous improvement and robust safety management expected in ISO 26262. The auditor’s role here is to confirm that this cycle is operational.
– Option 2 suggests focusing on the severity of the deviation and its potential impact on safety. While impact assessment is part of risk management, it doesn’t fully capture the procedural aspect of deviation management and learning.
– Option 3 emphasizes the documentation of deviations and their resolution. Documentation is necessary, but it’s the effectiveness of the resolution and the learning derived that are paramount for a functional safety culture.
– Option 4 highlights the disciplinary action for non-compliance. While accountability is important, an overemphasis on punitive measures can stifle the open reporting necessary for a healthy safety culture. ISO 26262 promotes learning from mistakes rather than solely focusing on punishment.

Therefore, the most comprehensive and effective approach for an internal auditor to assess the organization’s handling of deviations in relation to functional safety culture is to look for evidence of proactive identification, thorough root cause analysis, effective corrective actions, and verification of their impact, as described in the first option. This demonstrates a mature safety management system that learns and adapts.

The question tests the understanding of an internal auditor’s role in assessing the effectiveness of a functional safety management system (FSMS) during a period of significant organizational change, specifically the integration of a newly acquired company. The core of ISO 26262:2018, particularly Part 2 (Management of Functional Safety) and Part 8 (Supporting Processes), emphasizes the need for an FSMS to be robust and adaptable. When integrating a new entity, an auditor must verify that the existing FSMS principles are applied to the new operations without dilution, and that any new processes introduced are compliant. This involves scrutinizing the assimilation of safety culture, the application of the safety lifecycle, and the management of safety-related documentation and tools. The auditor needs to confirm that the transition plan explicitly addresses functional safety, including risk assessment, safety analyses, and verification activities, and that the competencies of personnel in the acquired entity are evaluated and potentially retrained to meet the standards of the parent organization. The ability to pivot strategies, maintain effectiveness during transitions, and openness to new methodologies are key behavioral competencies for the auditor themselves in this scenario. Specifically, the auditor must ensure that the acquired company’s safety processes are not merely overlaid but are fundamentally integrated and harmonized with the parent company’s FSMS, ensuring continuity of safety assurance and compliance with ISO 26262. The focus is on the *systemic* impact of the acquisition on the FSMS, not just isolated procedural checks. Therefore, the most critical aspect for an internal auditor to focus on is the comprehensive integration of the acquired entity’s safety processes and culture into the existing FSMS to ensure continued compliance and effective safety management.

The core of this question lies in understanding the auditor’s role in assessing the effectiveness of a safety culture, particularly how it influences the implementation of ISO 26262 processes. An internal auditor’s primary responsibility is to verify compliance and effectiveness, not to directly dictate changes in project strategy or personnel. When faced with evidence of a team struggling with ambiguity and a lack of clear strategic vision, the auditor’s focus should be on identifying the systemic causes within the safety management system that contribute to these behavioral issues. This involves examining how leadership communicates strategy, how expectations are set, and how feedback mechanisms operate. The auditor’s output is typically a report detailing findings and recommendations for improvement to the management system, not direct intervention in project execution or team composition. Therefore, the most appropriate action is to document these observations and recommend a review of leadership’s communication and expectation-setting processes as part of the overall safety management system audit. This aligns with the auditor’s mandate to assess the *system* and its *effectiveness*, including the behavioral competencies that underpin safety. Directing a specific team member to lead a strategy session or reassigning responsibilities falls outside the scope of an internal auditor’s authority and expertise in functional safety auditing. Similarly, recommending a specific new methodology without first understanding why current ones are failing or how they are being applied is premature and potentially ineffective. The auditor’s role is to ensure the *process* for developing and implementing strategies is robust and effective, which includes leadership’s role in communicating vision and setting expectations.

The core of this question lies in understanding how an internal auditor, specifically within the context of ISO 26262, should approach deviations from planned processes, particularly when those deviations are driven by evolving project needs or external factors. The auditor’s role is not to dictate technical solutions but to assess compliance with the functional safety management system and the adherence to the defined processes that ensure safety. When a critical safety component’s development timeline is significantly impacted by an unforeseen hardware design flaw requiring a substantial revision, the auditor must evaluate the *management’s response* to this deviation in the context of functional safety. This includes verifying that the deviation was properly documented, its safety implications were thoroughly analyzed (e.g., through a revised hazard analysis and risk assessment or a safety impact analysis), appropriate corrective actions were identified and implemented, and the overall safety lifecycle was maintained. The focus is on the *process* of managing the deviation and its impact on functional safety, not on the specific technical fix itself. Therefore, verifying that the revised development plan, including updated safety activities and documentation, has been formally approved and integrated into the project’s safety case is the most critical auditor action. This demonstrates that the deviation has been managed systematically and in accordance with the established safety management system, ensuring that the potential risks introduced by the flaw and its resolution are understood and controlled. Simply noting the delay or focusing solely on the technical fix would be insufficient. Investigating the root cause is part of the process, but the auditor’s primary concern is the *management* of that cause and its impact on safety.

The core of this question lies in understanding how an internal auditor, under ISO 26262:2018, should respond to a situation where a critical safety mechanism’s development has deviated significantly from its planned safety concept due to an emergent technological constraint. The auditor’s role is to assess compliance with the standard and the organization’s safety management system, not to dictate technical solutions. ISO 26262 emphasizes a structured approach to safety, including the management of changes and deviations. Part 2 (Management of Functional Safety) and Part 8 (Supporting Processes), particularly clauses related to configuration management and change control, are relevant here. The auditor must verify that any deviation, especially one impacting a safety goal, is properly documented, analyzed for its safety implications, and that appropriate corrective actions are taken, including potential re-evaluation of the ASIL or even the safety concept itself if the deviation fundamentally alters the risk profile. The auditor’s primary responsibility is to ensure the *process* for managing such deviations is followed and that the resulting product remains compliant with its safety requirements. Therefore, the most appropriate action is to initiate a formal deviation management process, which involves documenting the issue, assessing its impact on safety, and ensuring that appropriate stakeholders are involved in deciding on the corrective actions, which might include re-specifying requirements or conducting further safety analyses. This aligns with the auditor’s mandate to verify process adherence and safety assurance, rather than intervening directly in the technical problem-solving.

The question assesses an internal auditor’s understanding of behavioral competencies, specifically focusing on adaptability and flexibility in the context of ISO 26262. The scenario involves a sudden shift in project priorities due to a newly identified high-severity safety risk. The auditor’s role is to evaluate the project team’s adherence to functional safety processes, which are inherently dynamic. When a critical safety risk emerges, the team must pivot its strategy, potentially reallocating resources, revising development plans, and updating safety analyses. This requires a high degree of adaptability. The auditor must recognize that the team’s ability to adjust its approach, manage the uncertainty of the new risk, and maintain effectiveness during this transition is a key indicator of compliance with the spirit and letter of ISO 26262, particularly concerning risk management and safety lifecycle evolution. The auditor’s evaluation should focus on how the team *demonstrates* these behavioral traits in response to the change, rather than just stating they possess them. For instance, observing the team’s rapid reassessment of the hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA), their proactive communication of the revised plan, and their efficient reallocation of development effort to address the new risk would all be positive indicators. Conversely, resistance to change, continued focus on outdated priorities, or ineffective communication would suggest a deficiency. Therefore, assessing the team’s *demonstrated agility in response to emergent critical safety requirements* is the most pertinent evaluation criterion for the auditor in this scenario, reflecting the core principles of functional safety management and the behavioral competencies required to uphold them.

The core of the question revolves around identifying the most appropriate internal auditor behavioral competency when faced with a situation where a critical safety requirement, previously deemed low priority due to resource constraints, is now mandated for immediate implementation by a regulatory body, necessitating a significant shift in project focus and team effort. This scenario directly tests an auditor’s **Adaptability and Flexibility**. Specifically, it requires the auditor to assess how well an individual can adjust to changing priorities, handle ambiguity introduced by the new mandate, and maintain effectiveness during this transition. The auditor’s role is to evaluate the auditee’s adherence to ISO 26262 principles, which includes the ability of the functional safety team to respond to evolving external requirements. An auditor demonstrating strong adaptability would recognize the need to pivot strategies and embrace new methodologies if the original plan is no longer viable. Other competencies, while important, are less directly applicable to the *auditor’s assessment* of the auditee’s response in this specific context. For instance, while leadership potential is crucial for the auditee’s team, the auditor is assessing the team’s *ability to adapt*, not necessarily their leadership qualities in isolation. Similarly, communication skills are vital, but the primary challenge presented is the need for a strategic and operational shift. Problem-solving abilities are involved, but the overarching competency being tested in the auditor’s evaluation is their capacity to adapt to and assess the auditee’s adaptation to change.

The core of this question lies in understanding how an internal auditor for ISO 26262 must assess the effectiveness of a company’s functional safety management system, specifically concerning its adaptability to evolving project requirements and the management of safety-related changes. The auditor’s role is not merely to check for the existence of documented procedures but to verify their practical implementation and the organization’s ability to respond to deviations.

ISO 26262:2018, particularly Part 2 (Management of Functional Safety) and Part 8 (Supporting Processes), emphasizes the need for a robust change management process. When a critical safety requirement (e.g., related to the Anti-lock Braking System’s (ABS) deceleration control) is modified due to a new regulatory mandate from, for instance, the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA) for interoperability standards that indirectly impact vehicle safety, the functional safety management system must demonstrate its ability to:

1. **Identify the impact of the change:** The auditor needs to see evidence that the change’s implications on the safety goals, ASIL determination, and the overall safety case were thoroughly analyzed.
2. **Assess the safety impact:** This involves evaluating if the modification compromises existing safety mechanisms or introduces new hazards. The auditor would look for documented safety analyses (e.g., FMEA, FTA) that have been updated.
3. **Implement the change safely:** The auditor verifies that the updated requirements are flowed down to the relevant development phases (concept, system, hardware, software) and that verification and validation activities are adjusted accordingly. This includes re-testing and re-validation of affected safety functions.
4. **Maintain the safety case:** The overall safety argument must be updated to reflect the change, ensuring that the system remains compliant with the necessary safety integrity levels.

In this scenario, the auditor is evaluating the effectiveness of the organization’s response to a mandated change. The correct approach involves a comprehensive re-evaluation of the safety lifecycle activities affected by the change, not just a superficial update of documentation. The auditor’s objective is to confirm that the organization has maintained its functional safety posture despite the external regulatory pressure. The other options represent incomplete or insufficient responses from an ISO 26262 perspective. Simply documenting the change or performing a limited review without a full impact assessment and re-validation would not satisfy the standard’s requirements for managing safety-related changes. The auditor’s assessment is about the *process effectiveness* in maintaining safety, not just compliance with a reporting requirement.

The core of this question lies in understanding how an internal auditor, under ISO 26262, must approach deviations from planned processes, particularly concerning the integration of new, unproven methodologies. The scenario describes a situation where a critical safety mechanism’s development process deviates from the established ISO 26262 compliant plan due to the introduction of an experimental algorithmic approach. The auditor’s role is not to approve or reject the new methodology itself, but to ensure that the *process* for handling such deviations, and the subsequent impact on safety, is managed according to the standard.

ISO 26262 Part 6 (Product Development at the Software Level) and Part 8 (Supporting Processes), specifically clauses related to configuration management, change management, and verification, are relevant here. Part 8, Clause 10 (Verification) and Clause 11 (Documentation) are particularly pertinent. When a deviation occurs, especially one involving a novel technique that could impact functional safety, the auditor must verify that the organization has a robust process for assessing the impact of this change on the safety goals, the ASIL, and the overall safety case. This includes ensuring that:

1. **Impact Analysis:** The deviation has been thoroughly analyzed for its potential impact on safety. This involves understanding how the new algorithm affects the system’s behavior, potential failure modes, and the effectiveness of safety mechanisms.
2. **Change Management:** A formal change management process has been followed. This typically involves documenting the proposed change, assessing its impact (including safety impact), obtaining necessary approvals, and ensuring that all related work products (e.g., safety requirements, design documents, test plans) are updated accordingly.
3. **Verification and Validation:** The new methodology and its implementation have undergone rigorous verification and validation activities commensurate with the ASIL. This is crucial because an unproven methodology introduces uncertainty. The auditor needs to confirm that the verification strategy adequately addresses the risks associated with this uncertainty.
4. **Safety Case:** The safety case remains valid and defensible. The introduction of an experimental methodology might require updates to the safety case to justify its use and demonstrate that the required level of safety is still achieved.

Therefore, the auditor’s primary concern is the *process* of managing this deviation and its safety implications, not the technical merits of the experimental algorithm itself, unless those merits directly relate to the safety argument. The auditor must ensure that the deviation is handled in a controlled manner that maintains the integrity of the functional safety management system and the safety of the product.

The question asks what the auditor should prioritize. Prioritizing the *process* for managing deviations and ensuring that the impact on the safety case is adequately addressed aligns with the auditor’s mandate under ISO 26262. The other options represent either premature judgment on the technology, a focus on aspects outside the auditor’s primary scope in this immediate situation, or an incomplete view of the necessary steps.

The question assesses an internal auditor’s understanding of how to effectively manage deviations from the functional safety plan during an audit, particularly when faced with a critical safety issue discovered late in the process. ISO 26262:2018, specifically Part 2 (Management of Functional Safety) and Part 6 (Product Development at the Software Level), mandates robust processes for handling non-conformities and ensuring that safety goals are met. When a critical safety mechanism, like the redundant sensor input for braking control, is found to be incompletely validated late in the development lifecycle, it represents a significant deviation from the planned verification and validation activities. An internal auditor’s role is to identify such deviations, assess their impact on the overall safety case, and recommend appropriate corrective actions.

The auditor must first recognize that the discovery of an incomplete validation of a critical safety mechanism constitutes a major non-conformity. The immediate priority is to ensure that the potential safety risks are understood and mitigated. This involves escalating the issue to relevant stakeholders, including the project management and the functional safety manager, to facilitate a prompt and informed decision-making process. The auditor should then focus on the corrective actions necessary to address the identified gap. This might involve re-planning and executing the validation activities, potentially impacting project timelines and resources. The auditor’s responsibility is to ensure that these actions are effective in bringing the project back into compliance with the safety plan and the requirements of ISO 26262, without compromising the integrity of the safety case. The auditor should also document the deviation, the root cause, and the implemented corrective actions to support continuous improvement and future audits. The emphasis is on proactive risk management and ensuring that the functional safety requirements are met before product release.

The question probes the internal auditor’s understanding of how to effectively assess a supplier’s adherence to ISO 26262 requirements, specifically concerning the development of a safety-critical automotive component. The scenario involves a supplier demonstrating initial compliance but exhibiting potential weaknesses in their process for managing emergent risks during development.

The core of the question lies in identifying the most appropriate auditor action. Let’s analyze why the correct option is superior:

1. **Focus on the Safety Case and Risk Management:** The supplier’s inability to adequately document and communicate emergent risks, even with initial compliance, directly impacts the integrity of the safety case. ISO 26262, particularly Part 8 (Supporting Processes) and Part 3 (Concept Phase), emphasizes continuous risk assessment and management throughout the lifecycle. An internal auditor’s role is to verify that these processes are not just documented but are actively and effectively implemented.

2. **Evaluating the Effectiveness of Risk Mitigation:** The supplier’s approach to “addressing” risks by merely acknowledging them without robust, documented mitigation strategies or impact analyses is a significant finding. The auditor must assess the *effectiveness* of the supplier’s risk management, not just their procedural adherence. This requires looking beyond superficial compliance.

3. **Proactive vs. Reactive Auditing:** While reviewing existing documentation is a standard audit step, the scenario implies that the initial review might have missed this nuance, or the situation has evolved. The auditor needs to be proactive in identifying potential systemic weaknesses that could compromise safety.

4. **Consequences of Inadequate Risk Management:** Failure to manage emergent risks can lead to unaddressed hazards, which could manifest as safety goal violations in the final product. This directly contravenes the fundamental principles of functional safety.

Let’s consider why other options are less suitable:

* **Accepting the supplier’s explanation without further investigation:** This would be a failure of due diligence, as the auditor has identified a potential gap in the supplier’s safety processes. It prioritizes convenience over thoroughness.
* **Immediately escalating to a formal non-conformity report without root cause analysis:** While a non-conformity might be warranted, an auditor’s first step should be to understand the *why*. This might involve deeper investigation into the supplier’s risk management culture, training, or tools. A premature escalation might miss the underlying systemic issue.
* **Focusing solely on the initial design documentation:** The scenario explicitly mentions *emergent* risks during development. This indicates that the issue is not confined to the initial concept or design but is ongoing. Focusing only on the initial documentation would overlook the current state of risk management.

Therefore, the most effective auditor action is to delve deeper into the supplier’s risk management processes, specifically examining how emergent risks are identified, analyzed, mitigated, and documented, as this directly impacts the overall functional safety of the component and the vehicle. This aligns with the auditor’s responsibility to ensure that safety is integrated and maintained throughout the development lifecycle, as mandated by ISO 26262.

The core of this question lies in understanding how an internal auditor, operating under ISO 26262:2018, would approach a situation where a critical safety function’s development has been significantly delayed due to unforeseen software architecture challenges. The auditor’s role is not to solve the technical problem but to assess the *process* and *competencies* involved in managing such a deviation from the plan.

According to ISO 26262:2018, specifically concerning management of safety-related development (Part 2) and the V-model (Part 4), deviations from planned activities, especially those impacting safety goals, require rigorous management. An internal auditor must verify that the organization has robust mechanisms for:

1. **Change Management:** How are deviations from the planned development process identified, documented, assessed for impact on safety, approved, and implemented?
2. **Risk Management:** What are the processes for identifying, analyzing, and mitigating risks, including those arising from technical challenges? The delay itself is a risk to the project timeline and potentially the safety lifecycle.
3. **Competence Management:** Does the team possess the necessary skills to tackle complex architectural issues? If not, how is this gap addressed (e.g., training, external consultation)?
4. **Communication:** How are such critical issues communicated to relevant stakeholders, including management and potentially regulatory bodies if the delay has significant safety implications?
5. **Adaptability and Flexibility:** How does the organization adapt its strategies and plans when faced with unforeseen technical hurdles? This includes pivoting strategies and openness to new methodologies.
6. **Problem-Solving Abilities:** The auditor would look for evidence of systematic issue analysis and root cause identification related to the architectural challenges.

The auditor’s objective is to confirm that the organization’s functional safety management system is effectively implemented and maintained, especially in handling non-conformities and deviations. Therefore, the auditor would focus on the *process* of identifying the root cause of the delay, assessing its impact on the safety goals, and implementing corrective actions within the established safety management framework. This includes verifying that the team’s problem-solving approach, adaptability to architectural changes, and communication regarding the issue are aligned with ISO 26262 requirements. The delay itself is a symptom; the auditor’s focus is on the organizational response to that symptom within the safety lifecycle.

The core of this question lies in understanding the auditor’s role in verifying the effective implementation of a functional safety concept, specifically concerning the allocation of safety requirements to hardware and software elements, and the subsequent confirmation of their implementation. ISO 26262:2018, Part 4 (Product development at the system level) and Part 5 (Product development at the hardware level), and Part 6 (Product development at the software level) outline the processes for system design, hardware design, and software design, respectively. The safety requirements derived from the hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA) are refined into functional safety requirements at the system level. These are then allocated to architectural elements (hardware, software, or both) as technical safety requirements. The auditor’s task is to verify that this allocation is logical, traceable, and that the implemented hardware and software components fulfill their allocated technical safety requirements. This involves reviewing design specifications, implementation details, and verification results. The key is to ensure that the *entire* safety goal is achieved through the integrated system. Therefore, an auditor must confirm that the safety mechanisms, derived from the technical safety requirements, are correctly implemented in both the hardware and software components, and that their interaction contributes to the overall safety goal. This encompasses checking that hardware safety mechanisms are present and functioning as specified, and that software safety mechanisms are correctly coded, integrated, and verified, and that the combined effect meets the intended safety objective.

The scenario describes a situation where an internal auditor, Ms. Anya Sharma, is reviewing the functional safety management system of a Tier 1 automotive supplier developing an advanced driver-assistance system (ADAS) with a target ASIL D. The supplier has recently undergone a significant organizational restructuring, leading to new team structures and reporting lines. During the audit, Ms. Sharma discovers that while the safety plan has been updated to reflect these changes, several key personnel involved in the safety case development are expressing uncertainty about their precise responsibilities and the flow of communication regarding critical safety decisions. Specifically, there’s a perceived ambiguity in how newly formed cross-functional teams are expected to contribute to hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA) activities and how their findings are to be integrated into the overall safety argument. The supplier’s quality management system (QMS) is certified to ISO 9001, and its functional safety management system is intended to align with ISO 26262:2018.

The core issue is the effective implementation of behavioral competencies, particularly adaptability and flexibility in adjusting to changing priorities and handling ambiguity, as well as leadership potential in setting clear expectations and communication skills in simplifying technical information for diverse audiences within the context of ISO 26262. The supplier’s restructuring has created a transitional phase where established processes might not fully account for the new organizational dynamics. An internal auditor’s role is to assess the effectiveness of the implemented safety management system, not just its documentation. In this case, the auditor must evaluate whether the organizational changes have been adequately managed from a functional safety perspective, ensuring that roles, responsibilities, and communication channels are clearly defined and understood to maintain safety integrity. The evidence suggests a potential breakdown in communication and clarity of roles, impacting the systematic execution of safety activities. The auditor needs to identify if the organization has adequately addressed these transitional challenges to ensure continued compliance and effectiveness of the safety management system. The most appropriate action for the auditor is to identify this as a non-conformity, as the lack of clarity directly impacts the ability to consistently achieve functional safety objectives as required by ISO 26262, particularly concerning the management of safety activities and the competence of personnel.

The question probes the auditor’s understanding of how to assess the effectiveness of a safety culture within an automotive supplier adhering to ISO 26262. Specifically, it focuses on the behavioral competencies of leadership potential and adaptability, as well as teamwork and collaboration, within the context of managing a complex, multi-stakeholder project involving a new autonomous driving feature. The correct answer, “Evaluating the project lead’s proactive engagement in cross-functional problem-solving sessions and their documented adjustments to the project timeline based on emerging technical challenges and regulatory updates,” directly assesses these competencies. Proactive engagement demonstrates leadership potential and initiative, while documented adjustments reflect adaptability and effective teamwork in navigating ambiguity. The explanation emphasizes that an internal auditor must look for evidence of these behaviors in practice, not just stated policies. This involves observing how leaders motivate teams, delegate, make decisions under pressure, and how teams collaborate across disciplines (e.g., software, hardware, systems engineering) to resolve issues. The ability to pivot strategies, embrace new methodologies (like advanced simulation techniques), and maintain effectiveness during transitions are key indicators of a robust safety culture. The explanation also highlights the importance of the auditor’s own communication skills in eliciting this information and their analytical skills in interpreting the findings against the ISO 26262 requirements, particularly concerning the management of safety culture and organizational learning. The other options are less comprehensive or focus on tangential aspects. Option b incorrectly emphasizes solely the final deliverable without assessing the process and behaviors. Option c focuses narrowly on a single aspect of leadership (decision-making under pressure) without considering the broader behavioral context. Option d, while relevant to communication, doesn’t directly assess the core behavioral competencies of leadership and teamwork in the context of safety culture assessment.

The question probes the auditor’s understanding of how to assess the effectiveness of a safety culture within a development team, specifically concerning the proactive identification and mitigation of potential safety hazards. ISO 26262 emphasizes the importance of a robust safety culture, which is not merely about adherence to processes but also about the mindset and behavioral competencies of individuals. An internal auditor’s role is to verify that the functional safety management system is effectively implemented and maintained. This involves evaluating not just documented evidence but also the observable behaviors and attitudes of personnel.

When assessing behavioral competencies related to safety culture, an auditor looks for evidence of proactive hazard identification, open communication about safety concerns, and a willingness to challenge potentially unsafe practices. This directly aligns with the “Initiative and Self-Motivation” and “Problem-Solving Abilities” competencies, which include proactive problem identification, systematic issue analysis, and root cause identification. Furthermore, “Teamwork and Collaboration,” particularly active listening and support for colleagues, is crucial for a healthy safety culture where team members feel empowered to raise concerns. “Communication Skills,” especially the ability to simplify technical information and manage difficult conversations, are also vital.

Considering the options:
– Option a) focuses on observing team interactions during design reviews, specifically noting how members respond to deviations from safety requirements and whether they actively contribute to identifying potential risks. This directly assesses the behavioral competencies crucial for a strong safety culture as mandated by ISO 26262. It involves observing problem-solving, communication, and teamwork in a practical setting.
– Option b) suggests reviewing the change logs of a specific safety-related software component. While important for verifying process adherence, this primarily assesses technical documentation and process compliance rather than the underlying behavioral competencies that drive a proactive safety culture. It’s a retrospective view of technical changes, not a direct observation of how the team *behaves* regarding safety.
– Option c) proposes evaluating the team’s adherence to a predefined risk assessment matrix by checking if all identified hazards have been assigned appropriate risk levels. This focuses on the procedural aspect of risk management rather than the behavioral traits that lead to the initial identification and discussion of those hazards. It’s about applying a tool correctly, not about the team’s intrinsic safety awareness.
– Option d) involves assessing the project manager’s ability to delegate tasks and manage timelines. While project management is important for functional safety, this option focuses on leadership and project execution skills, which are distinct from the direct assessment of the team’s collective behavioral competencies in fostering a safety-conscious environment.

Therefore, the most effective method for an internal auditor to assess the team’s behavioral competencies contributing to a strong safety culture, in line with ISO 26262, is to observe their interactions and contributions during critical safety-focused activities like design reviews.

The scenario describes an internal audit of a functional safety management system for an automotive supplier. The auditor identifies a discrepancy where the safety manager, who is responsible for ensuring compliance with ISO 26262, also holds a significant role in the product development team, specifically leading the software architecture design for a critical safety component. This dual role presents a potential conflict of interest and a compromise of independence, which are fundamental principles for effective auditing and for the integrity of the functional safety process itself. ISO 26262, particularly in Part 2 (Management of Functional Safety) and Part 8 (Supporting Processes), emphasizes the need for impartiality and the avoidance of conflicts of interest to ensure objective assessments and robust safety management. An internal auditor’s role is to provide an independent and objective evaluation of the organization’s functional safety processes and their implementation. When the individual responsible for overseeing safety compliance is also directly involved in the development of safety-critical elements, their ability to objectively assess the effectiveness of those very elements, or the processes governing them, is compromised. This situation directly impacts the “Independence” aspect of the auditor’s role and the “Objectivity” requirement for functional safety assessments as mandated by the standard. Therefore, the most critical finding for the internal auditor to report is the compromised independence of the safety manager due to their direct involvement in product development, which undermines the objectivity of their oversight and the audit process itself. The other options, while potentially related to good practice or general management, do not directly address the core ISO 26262 requirement for independence in safety management and auditing that is violated in this specific scenario. The question tests the auditor’s understanding of the foundational principles of functional safety management and auditing as laid out in ISO 26262, specifically the critical need for independence to ensure objectivity.

The question probes the understanding of how an internal auditor, operating under ISO 26262:2018, should approach a situation where a critical safety mechanism’s development process has deviated from its approved safety plan, specifically concerning a change in software architecture without a formal safety impact analysis. The core of ISO 26262 mandates a systematic approach to functional safety, emphasizing the importance of managing changes that could affect safety. Part 6 (Product development at the software level) and Part 8 (Supporting processes), particularly Clause 9 (Configuration management) and Clause 12 (Management of functional safety during development), are highly relevant. Clause 9 dictates that changes to work products, including software architecture, must be controlled and assessed for their impact on safety. Clause 12 outlines the necessity of managing safety during development, which includes ensuring that development processes are followed and that deviations are handled appropriately. An auditor’s role is to verify compliance with these requirements. The auditor must first confirm that the deviation itself has been identified and documented. Then, the critical step is to assess whether the impact of this architectural change on the functional safety concept and the overall safety goals has been rigorously evaluated. This evaluation, often termed a safety impact analysis or a change impact assessment with a safety focus, is crucial. Without this analysis, the effectiveness of the safety measures implemented in the software cannot be assured. Therefore, the auditor’s primary concern is the *lack* of a documented, comprehensive safety impact assessment for the architectural change. The auditor would then need to verify if the implemented software still meets the ASIL requirements and if the original safety goals remain satisfied despite the unassessed architectural modification. The process should involve reviewing the change request, the rationale for the change, the absence of the safety impact analysis, and any subsequent verification or validation activities that might have implicitly covered the change’s safety implications, though this is less ideal than a proactive analysis. The auditor’s objective is to ensure that the organization’s processes for managing change and ensuring functional safety are robust and followed, especially when deviations occur. The most direct and critical finding for an internal auditor would be the absence of this documented safety impact assessment, as it represents a potential breakdown in the control mechanisms designed to maintain functional safety throughout the development lifecycle.

The question assesses an internal auditor’s understanding of how to evaluate the effectiveness of a supplier’s safety culture, specifically concerning their adherence to ISO 26262:2018 requirements for functional safety. The correct answer focuses on the auditor’s role in verifying objective evidence of systemic integration of safety principles, which is a core competency for an internal auditor. This involves looking beyond superficial statements to demonstrable practices. The other options represent either a misunderstanding of the auditor’s mandate (focusing on supplier profitability or internal supplier processes without a safety link), or an overreach into areas not directly verifiable through an audit of functional safety adherence (e.g., predicting future market success). An auditor’s primary responsibility is to assess compliance and effectiveness against established standards and processes, not to provide business consulting or market analysis. Therefore, the auditor should seek evidence of how safety is embedded in the supplier’s daily operations and decision-making, particularly as it relates to the development of safety-related automotive components. This includes examining how the supplier’s management promotes safety awareness, how safety is considered in resource allocation, and how lessons learned from safety incidents are systematically incorporated into future development cycles.

The core of this question lies in understanding how an internal auditor, operating under ISO 26262:2018, would assess the effectiveness of a safety culture initiative that aims to foster proactive hazard identification. The auditor’s role is to verify compliance and identify potential deviations from the standard’s requirements, particularly concerning the behavioral competencies that underpin functional safety. A key aspect of ISO 26262 is the emphasis on a robust safety culture, which includes the proactive reporting of potential issues. The auditor would look for evidence that the initiative directly supports this.

When evaluating the “proactive hazard identification” initiative, the auditor needs to consider how the organization’s processes and culture encourage employees to report potential safety concerns before they manifest as failures. This requires an assessment of the mechanisms in place for reporting, the responsiveness to such reports, and the feedback loop to the employees who raised them. It also involves evaluating whether employees feel empowered and safe to report without fear of reprisal, a crucial element of a healthy safety culture.

The auditor must then connect this to the specific behavioral competencies outlined in the standard and relevant to an internal auditor’s assessment framework. The initiative’s success hinges on employees demonstrating initiative and self-motivation by actively seeking out and reporting potential hazards, rather than waiting for issues to be discovered. This aligns directly with the competency of “Initiative and Self-Motivation,” specifically “Proactive problem identification” and “Going beyond job requirements.” It also touches upon “Communication Skills” (specifically “Feedback reception” and “Difficult conversation management” if the hazard reporting involves sensitive information) and “Adaptability and Flexibility” (specifically “Openness to new methodologies” if the reporting mechanism itself is novel).

Therefore, the most effective measure for the internal auditor to assess the success of such an initiative is to examine the observable behaviors and systemic responses that directly demonstrate the proactive identification and reporting of potential hazards. This includes reviewing records of reported hazards, the timeliness and nature of investigations, and any corrective actions taken, as well as gathering feedback from employees on their experience with the reporting process. The auditor is not just looking at the existence of a process, but its actual, effective implementation and the resultant behavioral changes that contribute to functional safety. The initiative’s success is measured by the *demonstrated* increase in proactive hazard reporting and the positive impact on the overall safety culture, which is a direct outcome of employees exhibiting initiative and self-motivation in identifying and communicating potential risks.

The question probes the internal auditor’s competency in assessing a supplier’s adherence to ISO 26262:2018, specifically concerning the integration of safety mechanisms derived from a preliminary hazard analysis and risk assessment (PHAR) into the software development lifecycle. The core of ISO 26262 requires that safety goals and their associated ASILs, established during the concept phase, are systematically decomposed and implemented throughout the development process. For a software component with a derived ASIL C, the standard mandates specific activities. Part 6 (Product development at the software level) outlines requirements for software unit design and implementation, software unit testing, and software integration testing. The audit objective is to verify that the supplier’s process adequately addresses these requirements.

The supplier’s claim of “rigorous code reviews and unit testing” is a general statement. An internal auditor must look for evidence of how these activities directly address the ASIL C requirements. ISO 26262-6:2018, Table 7 (Software unit design and implementation), specifies requirements like “design for testability” and “implementation of safety mechanisms.” Table 9 (Software unit testing) details methods such as “control flow testing” and “data flow testing” which are crucial for ASIL C. Furthermore, ISO 26262-8:2018, Clause 9 (Verification), emphasizes the importance of demonstrating the effectiveness of safety mechanisms through appropriate testing.

To achieve an ASIL C, the software development process must include verification activities that provide a high level of confidence in the absence of systematic faults. This involves not just testing, but also ensuring that the design and implementation phases have explicitly considered and incorporated the safety requirements derived from the PHAR. The auditor’s role is to confirm that the supplier’s documented processes and the evidence of their execution align with these ASIL C mandates. Therefore, the most critical aspect for the auditor to verify is the traceable implementation and verification of ASIL C safety requirements within the software development lifecycle, ensuring that the chosen testing methods are commensurate with the ASIL. This involves examining work products such as design documents, code, and test reports to confirm the presence and effectiveness of ASIL C-specific safety mechanisms and their verification.

The scenario describes a situation where an internal auditor is reviewing a supplier’s adherence to ISO 26262 requirements for a critical automotive component. The supplier has provided documentation indicating that their Safety Analysis Report (SAR) has been reviewed and approved, and that their work products have undergone a rigorous verification process. However, during the audit, the auditor discovers that the approval of the SAR was based on a preliminary hazard analysis that did not fully consider potential failure modes arising from specific environmental stresses (e.g., extreme temperature fluctuations) that are documented in the vehicle’s operating profile. Furthermore, the “rigorous verification” process relied heavily on static analysis tools without sufficient dynamic testing to validate the software’s behavior under fault injection scenarios.

ISO 26262:2018, specifically Part 8 (Supporting Processes) and Part 6 (Product development at the software level), mandates thoroughness in safety analyses and verification activities. The SAR (Part 3) is a key document that should reflect a comprehensive understanding of potential hazards and safety goals. The verification of software work products (Part 6) requires a combination of methods, including static and dynamic techniques, tailored to the ASIL level. The discovered discrepancies indicate a potential gap in the supplier’s ability to adapt their safety processes to the specific operational context and to maintain effectiveness during the development lifecycle, especially when dealing with nuanced technical challenges. An internal auditor’s role is to assess conformity to the standard and identify potential non-conformities that could impact functional safety. In this case, the auditor needs to identify the most significant finding that relates to the core principles of ISO 26262. The failure to adequately address environmental stresses in the hazard analysis and the over-reliance on static analysis without dynamic validation point to a systemic issue in the supplier’s safety culture and process execution. The auditor’s finding should reflect this systemic weakness.

The most critical finding relates to the adequacy of the safety analysis and verification processes. The preliminary hazard analysis not considering specific environmental stresses is a significant deviation from the expected thoroughness required by ISO 26262. Similarly, the lack of dynamic testing for fault injection is a gap in verification. These issues demonstrate a failure in adapting safety analyses to the specific context and in ensuring the robustness of the software through appropriate verification methods. The auditor’s role is to identify such non-conformities and their potential impact on functional safety. Therefore, the finding should highlight the inadequacy of the safety analysis and verification methods employed by the supplier, as these directly impact the achievement of the required ASIL. The other options are less direct or represent consequences rather than the root cause of the non-conformity from an auditing perspective.

The core of this question lies in understanding how an internal auditor, adhering to ISO 26262:2018, assesses the effectiveness of a supplier’s functional safety management system, specifically concerning their adherence to ASIL decomposition strategies. An internal auditor’s role is to verify compliance and identify potential deviations. When a supplier claims to have decomposed an ASIL D requirement into two ASIL B requirements for a specific component, the auditor must verify that this decomposition is technically sound and compliant with the standard. ISO 26262-9:2018, Clause 7 (ASIL decomposition) outlines the conditions under which ASIL decomposition is permissible. Key requirements include ensuring that the decomposed elements are sufficiently independent and that the decomposition does not introduce new systemic risks. The auditor’s objective is to confirm that the supplier has rigorously applied these principles. This involves reviewing the supplier’s safety analysis (e.g., FMEA, FTA), the architectural design documentation, and evidence of independence between the decomposed elements. The auditor is not there to redesign the system but to audit the supplier’s process and evidence against the standard. Therefore, the most appropriate action for the auditor is to scrutinize the supplier’s justification and supporting evidence for the decomposition, ensuring it meets the stringent criteria of ISO 26262-9. This includes verifying the independence of the decomposed elements and the absence of common cause failures that could negate the decomposition’s effectiveness. The auditor would seek documented evidence of this analysis and its validation.

The question assesses the internal auditor’s understanding of how to verify the effectiveness of a safety culture within a Tier 1 automotive supplier developing safety-critical electronic control units (ECUs) for advanced driver-assistance systems (ADAS). ISO 26262:2018 emphasizes the importance of a robust safety culture as a foundation for achieving functional safety. Part 2 of the standard, Management of Functional Safety, outlines requirements for organizational structures, roles, responsibilities, and the promotion of safety culture. Specifically, Clause 5.4.2 (Safety culture) mandates that the organization shall establish, implement, and maintain a safety culture that supports the achievement of functional safety.

To verify the effectiveness of this safety culture, an internal auditor needs to look beyond mere documentation and assess tangible evidence of its integration into daily operations and decision-making. This involves evaluating how safety is prioritized, how open communication channels exist for reporting potential hazards or deviations, and how learning from incidents (even near misses) is embedded.

Option a) is correct because observing how management actively champions safety initiatives, how employees feel empowered to raise concerns without fear of reprisal, and how safety performance is a regular topic in team meetings directly demonstrates the presence and effectiveness of a safety culture. This aligns with the principles of proactive safety management and the human factors considered in ISO 26262.

Option b) is incorrect. While reviewing the functional safety plan and confirming its existence is a procedural check, it doesn’t inherently verify the *effectiveness* of the safety culture. The plan itself is a document; its implementation and the underlying behaviors are what matter for culture.

Option c) is incorrect. Auditing the traceability of safety requirements to design and test cases is crucial for technical safety assurance, but it’s a verification of the technical safety lifecycle, not a direct assessment of the cultural underpinnings that drive the execution of that lifecycle. A culture that doesn’t prioritize safety might still have traceable requirements but fail in their implementation.

Option d) is incorrect. Examining the frequency of safety audits and the number of non-conformities identified is a measure of compliance and process adherence. While important, it doesn’t directly reveal the proactive attitudes, open communication, and shared commitment to safety that define an effective safety culture. A high number of non-conformities could indicate a weak culture or a highly effective detection mechanism, requiring further investigation into the *root causes* and the organization’s response.

The scenario describes an internal audit of a safety-critical automotive system development process. The auditor identifies a discrepancy where the Safety Plan, a key document required by ISO 26262 Part 2 (Management of Functional Safety), has not been updated to reflect a significant change in project scope and team structure. This change, impacting resource allocation and task assignments for safety activities, was introduced mid-project. According to ISO 26262:2018, the Safety Plan is a living document that must be maintained and adapted throughout the product lifecycle to ensure the effective management of functional safety. Failure to update it means that the planned safety activities, verification methods, and responsibilities might no longer be appropriate or adequately resourced, potentially leading to gaps in safety assurance. Therefore, the auditor’s finding directly relates to the non-compliance with the requirement for maintaining the Safety Plan as per the standard. The most appropriate auditor action is to document this as a non-conformity, as it represents a deviation from the established and mandated safety processes. This non-conformity signifies a failure in the management of functional safety, specifically concerning the diligent upkeep of the foundational safety planning document. The other options are less precise or represent potential consequences rather than the direct auditor action for this specific finding. Identifying a process gap is not a non-conformity itself but a description of the problem. Suggesting immediate corrective actions is a subsequent step after identifying the non-conformity, not the initial auditor action. Recommending a training session, while potentially beneficial, does not address the immediate procedural lapse in the audit finding.

The question tests the understanding of an internal auditor’s role in assessing a safety culture, specifically concerning the “openness to new methodologies” aspect of adaptability and flexibility. ISO 26262, particularly Part 2 (Management of functional safety) and Part 6 (Product development at the software level), emphasizes the need for continuous improvement and the adoption of effective methods. An internal auditor’s responsibility is to verify that processes and practices align with the standard’s intent. When evaluating adaptability, the auditor looks for evidence of proactive engagement with evolving safety engineering techniques, such as advancements in static analysis tools, formal verification methods, or new approaches to security-functional safety integration. The auditor would assess if the organization actively investigates, pilots, and potentially integrates these new methodologies to enhance its safety lifecycle. This involves reviewing meeting minutes where new tools or processes were discussed, training records on emerging techniques, and documented justifications for adopting or rejecting specific new methodologies. The absence of any such proactive exploration or a documented rationale for maintaining existing, potentially outdated, methods would indicate a deficiency in this behavioral competency, impacting the overall assessment of the safety culture and the effectiveness of the functional safety management system. Therefore, the auditor’s focus would be on the systematic evaluation of the organization’s approach to incorporating novel safety engineering practices.

The question probes the auditor’s ability to assess the effectiveness of a safety culture, specifically focusing on how an organization handles deviations from planned processes, a critical aspect of functional safety management under ISO 26262. The scenario describes a situation where a critical safety analysis, due to resource constraints, was performed by a team that deviated from the approved methodology. This deviation, while resulting in a timely completion of the analysis, introduced potential risks to the integrity of the safety case. An internal auditor’s primary responsibility in such a situation is to evaluate the *root cause* of the deviation and the *effectiveness of the corrective actions*, not merely the outcome or the intention.

The deviation from the approved methodology (Part 6, Clause 6.4.4) without proper change control or justification (Part 2, Clause 5.4.2) is a non-conformity. The auditor must assess if the organization has a robust system for identifying, reporting, and analyzing such non-conformities. The focus should be on whether the deviation was documented, investigated for its impact on safety, and if appropriate corrective and preventive actions were implemented. The prompt mentions the team leader’s rationale was “resource constraints,” which is an input for the investigation but not an excuse for bypassing established processes.

Option a) correctly identifies that the auditor must verify the root cause analysis of the deviation and the implementation of corrective actions that prevent recurrence, aligning with the principles of continuous improvement and robust safety management systems (Part 2, Clause 6). This includes examining whether the deviation was properly documented, its potential safety impact assessed, and if the corrective actions address both the immediate issue and systemic weaknesses.

Option b) is incorrect because while stakeholder communication is important, it’s secondary to understanding the impact of the methodological deviation on the safety analysis itself. The auditor’s primary concern is the integrity of the safety case.

Option c) is incorrect because focusing solely on the team leader’s intent or the positive outcome (timely completion) overlooks the fundamental requirement of adhering to established safety processes. The “why” behind the deviation and its systemic implications are more critical than the immediate result.

Option d) is incorrect as it misinterprets the auditor’s role. The auditor’s task is to assess compliance and effectiveness of the safety management system, not to directly implement process improvements or dictate future resource allocation, although their findings may inform such decisions. The auditor’s role is evaluative and investigative, not managerial in the direct sense of re-assigning tasks or approving methodologies.

Therefore, the most comprehensive and accurate assessment of the auditor’s responsibility in this scenario is to verify the root cause analysis and the effectiveness of corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence of such deviations, ensuring the integrity of the functional safety processes.

The scenario describes an internal auditor assessing a Tier 1 supplier’s adherence to ISO 26262:2018, specifically focusing on the implementation of a safety mechanism for an advanced driver-assistance system (ADAS). The supplier has encountered unexpected delays in validating a critical software component due to unforeseen interactions with legacy hardware. The auditor’s role is to evaluate the supplier’s response to this situation, which involves adapting their project plan and potentially their safety strategy. The question probes the auditor’s understanding of how to assess the supplier’s “Adaptability and Flexibility” competency in the context of functional safety.

The core of the assessment lies in how the supplier demonstrates adjustment to changing priorities and handles ambiguity. The supplier’s action of re-prioritizing testing efforts, engaging cross-functional teams (software, hardware, systems), and communicating the revised timeline and potential impact on the safety case directly reflects these competencies. This proactive approach, involving a shift in strategy (pivoting) and openness to new testing methodologies to address the unforeseen issue, is a key indicator of flexibility. The auditor would look for evidence of this adaptability, such as updated risk assessments, revised work breakdown structures, and documented decisions justifying the changes. The explanation of why this is the correct answer focuses on the direct linkage between the supplier’s actions (re-prioritization, cross-functional engagement, communication of impact) and the defined behavioral competency of adaptability and flexibility, which is a crucial aspect for an internal auditor to assess in a functional safety context. The supplier’s response is not merely about problem-solving, but about how they *adapt* their approach to maintain effectiveness during a transition caused by unexpected technical challenges.

The question assesses the understanding of how an internal auditor for ISO 26262:2018 would approach a situation involving a potential deviation from a safety plan due to a critical component failure discovered late in the development cycle. The auditor’s role is to verify compliance with the standard and ensure that the safety case remains robust. In this scenario, the critical component failure directly impacts the previously established safety goals and the allocated ASIL. The initial ASIL of C for the braking system’s anti-lock function, derived from the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) and detailed in the Functional Safety Concept (FSC) and Technical Safety Concept (TSC), is now potentially invalidated.

An internal auditor must evaluate the effectiveness of the implemented safety measures and the processes used to manage deviations. The discovery of the component failure late in the cycle suggests potential weaknesses in the earlier stages, such as requirements management, design verification, or supplier quality assurance. The auditor’s primary concern is to ensure that the safety argument is still valid and that any necessary revisions to the safety plan, safety goals, or even the ASIL determination are conducted systematically and documented thoroughly, in accordance with ISO 26262 Part 2 (Management of Functional Safety) and Part 8 (Supporting Processes), specifically clauses related to change management and configuration management.

The auditor’s task is not to redesign the system or dictate a solution but to audit the *process* by which the organization is addressing this deviation. This involves verifying that the necessary steps are being taken to reassess the safety goals, update the safety requirements, re-evaluate the ASIL if necessary, and implement appropriate safety measures. The auditor would look for evidence of a robust change management process that considers the impact on the safety case. The most appropriate action for the auditor is to ensure that the organization initiates a formal reassessment of the safety goals and the ASIL, leading to a revised safety plan and updated safety requirements. This directly addresses the potential compromise of the safety case and ensures continued compliance with ISO 26262.

Option (a) correctly identifies the need for a formal reassessment of safety goals and ASIL, which is the foundational step in addressing such a critical deviation. Option (b) is incorrect because while documenting the failure is important, it’s a procedural step, not the primary corrective action for the safety case itself. Option (c) is incorrect because the auditor’s role is not to approve or reject design changes directly, but to audit the process for managing them and their impact on safety. Option (d) is incorrect as escalating to regulatory bodies might be a consequence of failing to manage the deviation properly, but it’s not the auditor’s immediate corrective action; the focus is on internal process compliance first.