The core of this question lies in understanding the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) decomposition and the resulting safety goals. ASIL decomposition, as defined in ISO 26262, allows for the reduction of the ASIL of a safety requirement if it is allocated to a system element that is sufficiently independent from other elements that could cause the same hazardous event. The principle is that if a failure in one element cannot propagate to or affect another element that is responsible for preventing the same hazard, then the ASIL of the latter element can be reduced.

Consider a system with a primary safety goal, SG1, assigned ASIL D. This safety goal is to prevent unintended acceleration. The system architecture includes a primary control unit (PCU) and a redundant backup unit (BCU). If the PCU fails, the BCU is intended to take over. However, a common cause failure (CCF) mechanism has been identified that could affect both the PCU and BCU simultaneously, meaning they are not sufficiently independent. To achieve independence, a new safety mechanism is introduced, a separate sensor array (SSA) that monitors vehicle speed and can trigger a safe state independently of the PCU and BCU.

If the SSA is designed to detect the same hazardous event (unintended acceleration) and can independently bring the vehicle to a safe state, and its failure modes are sufficiently independent from the PCU and BCU failure modes (e.g., different hardware technology, different development teams, different power supplies), then the safety goal associated with the SSA can be decomposed. Specifically, if the SSA is responsible for preventing the same hazardous event as SG1, and its independence is proven, the ASIL of the safety goal allocated to the SSA can be reduced. The question asks for the *maximum* ASIL that can be assigned to the safety goal for the SSA, given that it is intended to mitigate the same hazard as SG1 (ASIL D) and the decomposition is being performed. The decomposition process, when successful in establishing sufficient independence, allows for a reduction in ASIL. The most stringent ASIL that can be achieved through decomposition from ASIL D, without further specific constraints or evidence of even higher independence, is ASIL B. This is because ASIL decomposition typically involves reducing the ASIL by two levels, from D to B, or from C to A. While a reduction to ASIL A is theoretically possible if the decomposition evidence is exceptionally strong and the original ASIL was D, the standard practice and most common outcome of a successful decomposition from ASIL D, demonstrating sufficient independence to mitigate the same hazard, results in an ASIL B. Therefore, the safety goal for the SSA, if it successfully meets the independence criteria for ASIL decomposition from an ASIL D safety goal, would be assigned ASIL B.

The core of this question lies in understanding the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) decomposition and the resulting safety goals. ASIL decomposition, as defined in ISO 26262-9:2018, allows for the reduction of the ASIL of a safety requirement for a component if that component is sufficiently independent from other components that could violate the safety goal. The decomposition is permissible if the probability of common cause failures (CCF) is sufficiently low, typically assessed through methods like the α-factor. When ASIL decomposition is applied, the safety goal’s ASIL is not directly changed; rather, the ASIL of the *elements* contributing to that safety goal are reduced. The safety goal itself remains the highest ASIL determined for the system’s function. Therefore, if a system has a safety goal with ASIL D, and ASIL decomposition is applied to some of its elements, the safety goal itself retains its ASIL D designation. The decomposition affects the ASIL of the sub-elements or components, not the overarching safety goal. This principle ensures that the highest level of safety integrity is maintained for the critical function, even when individual components have reduced ASILs due to effective independence and fault tolerance mechanisms.

The core of this question lies in understanding the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) decomposition and the resulting safety goals and requirements. ASIL decomposition, as defined in ISO 26262, allows for the reduction of the ASIL of a component or element if it is sufficiently independent from other elements that could violate the safety goal. Specifically, Part 9 of ISO 26262 addresses ASIL decomposition. When a safety goal is decomposed, the new safety goals derived from the original one inherit the ASIL unless a decomposition strategy is applied. For a successful ASIL decomposition, the decomposed elements must be sufficiently independent, meaning that a single random hardware failure in one element does not cause a failure in another element that would lead to the violation of the original safety goal. If the independence criteria are met, the ASIL of the decomposed elements can be reduced. For example, if a safety goal with ASIL D is decomposed into two independent safety goals, each could potentially be assigned ASIL B. The explanation for the correct option is that the independence of the decomposed elements is the primary criterion for reducing the ASIL. Without demonstrated independence, the ASIL cannot be reduced through decomposition. The other options present incorrect assumptions about ASIL decomposition. Assigning a lower ASIL based solely on the number of decomposed elements is not a valid method. Similarly, the ASIL of the original safety goal is not directly inherited by all decomposed elements without considering independence. Finally, the assumption that ASIL decomposition is only applicable to software elements is incorrect; it applies to hardware and system elements as well.

The core of functional safety management within ISO 26262 is the systematic identification and mitigation of risks associated with electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems in road vehicles. The standard mandates a lifecycle approach, starting from concept development through decommissioning. A critical aspect of this lifecycle is the verification and validation (V&V) phase, which ensures that the implemented safety measures are effective and that the system meets its specified safety goals. Part 8 of ISO 26262 specifically addresses supporting processes, including configuration management, change management, and problem resolution. However, the question probes the fundamental objective of the safety lifecycle, which is to achieve and maintain the required level of safety. This is accomplished by ensuring that all safety activities, from hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA) to the implementation of safety mechanisms and their subsequent verification, are performed correctly and contribute to the overall safety case. The ultimate goal is to prevent unreasonable risk. Therefore, the most encompassing and accurate description of the primary objective of the functional safety lifecycle, as defined by ISO 26262, is the prevention of unreasonable risk through systematic safety management. This involves a continuous process of identifying, assessing, and controlling hazards throughout the entire product lifecycle.

The core of this question lies in understanding the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) decomposition and the resulting safety goals. ASIL decomposition, as defined in ISO 26262, allows for the reduction of the ASIL of a component if it is sufficiently independent from other components that could cause a common cause failure. However, the safety goals themselves are derived from the hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA) and represent the top-level safety requirements. Decomposing an ASIL for a system element does not alter the fundamental safety goals that the system must achieve to prevent unreasonable risk. The safety goals remain the same, irrespective of how the ASIL is distributed or decomposed among the system’s elements. Therefore, if a system has a safety goal of “Prevent unintended acceleration,” this goal must be met regardless of whether the ASIL of the electronic throttle control module is decomposed from ASIL D to ASIL B. The decomposition affects the rigor of the development processes for the decomposed element, not the ultimate safety objective.

The core of this question lies in understanding the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) decomposition and the resulting safety goals and requirements. When an ASIL is decomposed, the objective is to derive lower ASILs for specific elements or functions, provided that the safety mechanisms implemented at the higher level are sufficiently robust and independent. Specifically, if a system with a high ASIL (e.g., ASIL D) is decomposed into two independent elements, each assigned ASIL B, the combination of these two ASIL B elements must provide a safety level equivalent to the original ASIL D. This equivalence is typically achieved by ensuring that the probability of simultaneous failure of both decomposed elements is sufficiently low. The standard approach to verifying this equivalence involves considering the failure rates and diagnostic coverage of the mechanisms implementing the ASIL B functions. A common method to quantify this is by ensuring that the probability of failure of the decomposed system, \(P_{fail\_decomposed}\), is less than or equal to the probability of failure of the original system, \(P_{fail\_original}\). For ASIL D, the target probability of hazardous events per hour is typically in the range of \(10^{-8}\) to \(10^{-7}\). If two ASIL B elements are considered, and assuming independence, the probability of both failing simultaneously would be the product of their individual probabilities of failure. If each ASIL B element is designed to meet its respective ASIL B targets (e.g., \(10^{-7}\) to \(10^{-6}\) probability of hazardous event per hour), the combined probability of failure would be approximately \(10^{-7} \times 10^{-7} = 10^{-14}\) if we consider the upper bound of ASIL B. However, ASIL decomposition is not simply a multiplication of probabilities. It’s about achieving the *same* safety goal. The safety goal for ASIL D requires a certain level of risk reduction. Decomposing to two ASIL B elements means that each ASIL B element must contribute to achieving that overall ASIL D safety goal. The critical aspect is that the safety mechanisms at the ASIL D level must be sufficiently effective. If an ASIL D safety goal is decomposed, and the decomposition results in two elements, each with ASIL B, the safety mechanisms of the original ASIL D system must be distributed or replicated such that the failure of one ASIL B element does not lead to a violation of the ASIL D safety goal. This implies that the safety mechanisms that would have been required for ASIL D must still be present, either within each ASIL B element or through complementary mechanisms. The most accurate representation of this is that the safety goal itself is not decomposed; rather, the implementation of the safety goal is decomposed. Therefore, the safety goal remains at ASIL D, and the decomposed elements must collectively satisfy this ASIL D safety goal. The other options represent misunderstandings of ASIL decomposition: assigning ASIL B to the safety goal itself is incorrect, as the decomposition applies to the implementation, not the goal’s integrity level; simply summing the ASILs is not a valid method; and assigning ASIL C to the safety goal would imply a reduction in the required safety level without proper justification or analysis of the decomposition’s effectiveness. The correct understanding is that the safety goal’s ASIL remains unchanged, and the decomposed elements must achieve it.

The core of functional safety management, as defined by ISO 26262, involves establishing and maintaining a safety culture and ensuring that safety is integrated throughout the entire product lifecycle. Part 2 of the standard specifically addresses management of functional safety. It mandates the creation of a Safety Management Plan, which outlines the necessary safety activities, responsibilities, and the organizational structure for achieving functional safety. This plan is a crucial document that guides all safety-related efforts. It should detail how safety requirements will be managed, how safety activities will be performed and verified, and how the overall safety case will be constructed. The establishment of a dedicated safety department or the assignment of specific safety roles within the organization is a key element to ensure that functional safety is given the necessary attention and resources. This organizational structure facilitates clear communication, accountability, and the consistent application of safety processes. Without a robust safety management system and a clear organizational framework, the effective implementation of functional safety principles becomes significantly challenging, potentially leading to an incomplete or ineffective safety case. Therefore, the existence of a comprehensive Safety Management Plan and a well-defined organizational structure are foundational for achieving the safety goals mandated by ISO 26262.

The core of functional safety development, as delineated by ISO 26262, involves a systematic approach to hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA). The ASIL (Automotive Safety Integrity Level) determination is a critical output of this process, directly influencing the rigor of subsequent safety activities. ASIL determination is based on three key parameters: Severity (S), Exposure (E), and Controllability (C). Each parameter is assigned a level from 0 to 4, with higher numbers indicating greater risk. The combination of these levels, following specific rules defined in Part 3 of the standard, results in an ASIL rating of A, B, C, or D, or QM (Quality Management).

For ASIL determination, the standard outlines specific rules for combining S, E, and C values. For instance, a high Severity (S3 or S4), combined with a high Exposure (E3 or E4) and low Controllability (C0 or C1), would lead to a higher ASIL. Conversely, low values across all parameters would result in a QM rating. The process is iterative and requires expert judgment, especially when dealing with complex scenarios or novel technologies. The ASIL assigned to a safety goal dictates the necessary safety measures and the required level of confidence in their effectiveness throughout the product lifecycle. Understanding the interplay of S, E, and C, and how they translate into ASILs, is fundamental to applying ISO 26262 effectively.

The core of this question lies in understanding the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) decomposition and the resulting safety goals. ASIL decomposition, as defined in ISO 26262, allows for the reduction of the ASIL of a safety requirement for a specific element if that element is implemented with a higher level of independence from other elements that implement the same safety function. The principle is that by ensuring sufficient independence, the probability of common cause failures affecting all redundant elements simultaneously is sufficiently reduced.

When a safety goal with ASIL D is decomposed into two elements, each responsible for a portion of the safety function, and these elements are implemented with sufficient independence, the ASIL of the safety requirements allocated to each element can be reduced. The standard provides guidelines for determining the degree of independence required. If the decomposition is performed correctly, and the independence criteria are met, the ASIL of the safety requirements for each decomposed element can be reduced to ASIL B. This is because the probability of both independent elements failing simultaneously due to a common cause is significantly lower than a single element failing. The ASIL decomposition process aims to achieve a lower ASIL for the sub-elements while maintaining the overall safety integrity of the original safety goal. Therefore, if the initial safety goal is ASIL D and it is successfully decomposed into two independent elements, the resultant ASIL for each element’s safety requirements would be ASIL B.

The core of this question lies in understanding the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) decomposition and the resulting safety goals and requirements for a redundant system. When an ASIL C safety goal is decomposed into two independent ASIL B elements, the assumption is that the failure of one element does not impact the safety function provided by the other. The ASIL of a decomposed element is determined by the ASIL of the parent safety goal and the effectiveness of the decomposition. For a complete decomposition that maintains the original safety goal’s integrity, the ASIL of the decomposed elements should be lower than or equal to the parent ASIL. In this scenario, decomposing ASIL C into two ASIL B elements is a valid strategy, as the combined probability of failure of the two ASIL B elements, when considered independently, should meet the target probability of failure for the original ASIL C safety goal. The key is that the decomposition must be demonstrably effective, meaning the independence of the two elements is rigorously verified. Therefore, the safety goal for each of the ASIL B elements would be to achieve the target ASIL C probability of failure, but through independent means. This ensures that a single point of failure in one element does not compromise the overall safety function. The explanation focuses on the principle of ASIL decomposition and its implications for the safety goals of the resulting elements, emphasizing the independence required for such a decomposition to be effective in achieving the original safety integrity level.

The core of functional safety development, as delineated by ISO 26262, involves the systematic identification and mitigation of hazards. For a complex system like an advanced driver-assistance system (ADAS) that utilizes sensor fusion for object detection, a critical aspect is the robustness of its safety mechanisms against potential failures. When considering the transition from a preliminary hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA) to the conceptualization of safety goals, the focus shifts to defining what must be achieved to prevent unreasonable risk. A safety goal is a top-level safety requirement that specifies the necessary risk reduction for a particular hazardous event. It is derived directly from the HARA and is assigned an Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL). The ASIL determination is a crucial step, influenced by the severity of potential harm, the likelihood of exposure to the hazardous situation, and the controllability of the situation by the driver. For a system that could lead to unintended acceleration or deceleration, the potential severity of harm can be high. The exposure to such a situation might be frequent, and the driver’s ability to regain control could be limited, especially in dynamic driving scenarios. Therefore, a safety goal must encapsulate the necessary performance and integrity of the system to prevent such hazardous events. The safety goal itself is not a technical solution but a statement of what needs to be achieved. It guides the subsequent development phases, including the definition of functional safety requirements and technical safety requirements. The process emphasizes a top-down approach, ensuring that the ultimate safety objectives are clearly defined before delving into specific design implementations. The safety goal for unintended deceleration, for instance, would articulate the required integrity level for preventing such an event, without specifying the particular sensor or algorithm to be used. This ensures that the safety objective remains paramount throughout the development lifecycle, allowing for flexibility in technical implementation while guaranteeing the required level of safety.

The question probes the understanding of how to determine the appropriate safety goal for a newly identified hazard during the concept phase, specifically when the hazard’s severity is assessed as potentially causing severe injuries or fatalities. ISO 26262:2018, Part 3, Clause 6.4.3, outlines the process for deriving safety goals from hazards. When a hazard’s potential outcome is classified as severe (e.g., severe injuries or fatalities), the corresponding safety goal must aim to prevent or mitigate these outcomes. The ASIL (Automotive Safety Integrity Level) determination is a crucial step in this process, influenced by the hazard’s severity, controllability, and exposure. For a hazard with high severity (S3), even with moderate controllability (C2) and high exposure (E3), the resulting ASIL would be ASIL D, the highest integrity level. Therefore, the safety goal must be formulated to achieve the highest level of risk reduction necessary to meet this ASIL D requirement. This involves defining a top-level safety requirement that directly addresses the hazard and is allocated to the system with the necessary rigor. The safety goal itself is a top-level safety requirement that specifies the necessary safety measures to prevent or mitigate the identified hazard. It is derived from the hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA). The ASIL assigned to the hazard dictates the stringency of the safety goal and subsequent safety requirements. A safety goal is not a specific technical solution but rather a statement of what needs to be achieved from a safety perspective. The correct approach is to define a safety goal that directly addresses the prevention of severe injuries or fatalities, thereby fulfilling the requirements of the highest ASIL determined for that hazard.

The question probes the understanding of the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) and the required rigor in verification activities, specifically focusing on the impact of ASIL decomposition on the safety validation process. For a safety goal with an ASIL D, the required verification activities are typically more stringent and comprehensive than for a lower ASIL. When ASIL decomposition is applied, and a component is assigned a lower ASIL (e.g., ASIL B), the verification methods for that component must still satisfy the requirements for the *original* ASIL D safety goal, but the *methods themselves* can be tailored to the ASIL B. However, the overall safety validation of the system, which confirms the achievement of the ASIL D safety goal, must still demonstrate compliance with the rigor expected for ASIL D. This means that while specific component verification might be less rigorous due to decomposition, the system-level validation must still provide sufficient evidence for the ASIL D. Therefore, the safety validation of the system must ensure that the decomposition does not compromise the achievement of the ASIL D safety goal, and this often involves a combination of methods that collectively provide the necessary confidence. The key is that the *system’s* safety goal remains ASIL D, and the validation must prove this, even if parts of the system are verified at a lower ASIL. The explanation should highlight that ASIL decomposition affects the verification of individual elements, but the overall system validation must still address the original safety goal’s ASIL.

The question probes the understanding of the functional safety concept of “freedom from interference” within the context of ISO 26262, specifically concerning the allocation of safety-related software components to different hardware execution environments. Freedom from interference ensures that a lower ASIL component does not negatively impact the safety of a higher ASIL component when they share resources. Part 6 of ISO 26262, specifically Clause 7.4.10, addresses the allocation of software components to hardware execution environments. It mandates that if software components with different ASILs are allocated to the same processing unit, measures must be implemented to prevent interference. These measures can include temporal or spatial partitioning, or robust error detection mechanisms. The core principle is to ensure that a failure in a lower ASIL component, or its execution, does not compromise the correct functioning of a higher ASIL component. Therefore, the most appropriate measure to ensure freedom from interference when a QM software component and an ASIL D software component are allocated to the same microcontroller, and the ASIL D component relies on the QM component for certain data, is to implement robust mechanisms that prevent the QM component’s potential failures from corrupting the ASIL D component’s execution or data integrity. This often involves memory protection, runtime monitoring, and strict data validation, which are encompassed by the concept of ensuring the ASIL D component’s integrity is not compromised by the QM component’s execution.

The core of this question lies in understanding the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) and the required rigor for verification and validation activities, specifically concerning the confirmation measures for the safety plan. ISO 26262:2018, Part 8, Clause 9, details the confirmation measures. For ASIL D, the highest ASIL, the standard mandates a higher level of independence and scrutiny for these activities. This includes independent reviews and audits by personnel not involved in the development of the safety-related item. The confirmation review of the safety plan itself is a critical step to ensure its adequacy and the planned execution of safety activities. Therefore, for ASIL D, a confirmation review by an independent functional safety assessor is the most stringent and appropriate confirmation measure to ensure the safety plan’s robustness and compliance with the standard’s requirements. Lower ASILs might allow for less independent reviews, or reviews conducted by personnel within the same organizational unit but not directly involved in the specific development task. The emphasis for ASIL D is on demonstrating that the safety plan is comprehensive and that the planned verification and validation activities will effectively mitigate identified risks.

The correct approach involves understanding the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) decomposition and the resulting safety goals. ASIL decomposition, as defined in ISO 26262, allows for the reduction of the ASIL of a safety requirement if the decomposition is performed correctly and the resulting lower-ASIL elements are sufficiently independent. Specifically, if a safety goal with ASIL D is decomposed into two independent elements, each with ASIL B, the independence is crucial. The standard (Part 9, Clause 6) outlines criteria for independence, which, if met, allow for this decomposition. The question asks about the ASIL of the safety goal derived from the decomposition. When a safety goal is decomposed into multiple independent elements, the ASIL of the original safety goal is effectively inherited by the decomposed elements, but the decomposition itself aims to manage the risk by assigning lower ASILs to individual components, provided sufficient independence is demonstrated. However, the safety goal itself, representing the top-level objective to prevent hazards, retains its original ASIL unless the entire system architecture is fundamentally altered to achieve a lower overall risk profile for that specific safety goal. The decomposition is a method to achieve the original safety goal with potentially less stringent requirements on individual components, but it does not change the inherent safety goal’s required integrity level. Therefore, if the original safety goal was ASIL D, and the decomposition is a method to achieve it, the safety goal itself remains ASIL D. The options provided are ASIL A, ASIL B, ASIL C, and ASIL D. The decomposition process does not inherently lower the ASIL of the overarching safety goal; rather, it allows for the implementation of that safety goal using components with lower ASILs, assuming independence. Thus, the safety goal’s ASIL remains the highest required level.

The correct approach involves understanding the fundamental principles of safety validation and verification within the ISO 26262 framework, specifically concerning the transition from the system level to the hardware level. The question probes the appropriate method for confirming that the safety requirements allocated to hardware are adequately addressed by the hardware design and implementation. This requires a systematic evaluation of the hardware’s ability to meet its specified safety goals and functional requirements, considering potential failure modes and their impact. The process involves reviewing design documentation, performing analyses such as FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) or FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) at the hardware level, and potentially conducting hardware testing to verify the effectiveness of safety mechanisms. The emphasis is on ensuring that the hardware design itself embodies the necessary safety properties to prevent or control hazardous events as defined by the safety goals. This validation activity is a crucial step in the overall safety lifecycle, bridging the gap between system-level safety concepts and their concrete realization in hardware components.

The core of this question lies in understanding the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) decomposition and the resulting safety goals and requirements. ASIL decomposition, as defined in ISO 26262, allows for the reduction of the ASIL of a component or element if it is sufficiently independent from other elements that could violate the safety goal. However, the decomposition itself does not eliminate the need for safety mechanisms to achieve the original safety goal. The decomposed ASIL applies to the *new* safety requirements for the *decomposed* element, not to the original safety goal or the system as a whole. Therefore, if a safety goal is initially assigned ASIL D and is decomposed into two elements, each assigned ASIL B, the original safety goal still requires ASIL D integrity. The safety mechanisms for the ASIL B elements must collectively ensure the ASIL D integrity of the original safety goal. This means that the safety requirements derived from the ASIL D safety goal must still be met, even though the individual decomposed elements have lower ASILs. The decomposition process influences the safety requirements for the sub-elements, but the overall safety goal’s integrity level remains the benchmark. The question tests the understanding that decomposition is a method to manage complexity and achieve a higher ASIL through lower ASIL elements, but it doesn’t negate the original safety objective’s required integrity.

The core of this question lies in understanding the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) decomposition and the resulting safety goals. ASIL decomposition, as defined in ISO 26262, allows for the reduction of the ASIL of a component or element if it is sufficiently independent from other elements that could cause a common cause failure. Specifically, if a system is partitioned such that a failure in one partition does not affect the safety of another, and the ASIL of the original safety goal is \(ASIL_D\), and the decomposition results in two independent elements each with an ASIL of \(ASIL_B\), then the safety goal for each of these decomposed elements is \(ASIL_B\). This is because the independence assumption allows the risk to be distributed across multiple, uncorrelated failures. The rationale is that the probability of two independent \(ASIL_B\) failures occurring simultaneously is significantly lower than a single \(ASIL_D\) failure. The independence is typically achieved through measures like spatial separation, diverse hardware, or diverse software. Therefore, when a safety goal with \(ASIL_D\) is decomposed into two independent elements, each with an ASIL of \(ASIL_B\), the safety goal for each of these elements becomes \(ASIL_B\).

The core of this question lies in understanding the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) decomposition and the resulting safety goals. ASIL decomposition, as defined in ISO 26262, allows for the reduction of the ASIL of a component if it is sufficiently independent from other components that could violate the safety goal. However, the decomposition process itself does not eliminate the need for a safety goal; it merely assigns a potentially lower ASIL to the decomposed elements. The original safety goal, derived from the hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA), remains the overarching objective. Therefore, even after a successful ASIL decomposition, the safety goal that was decomposed still needs to be achieved, albeit potentially through elements with reduced ASILs. The decomposition process is a method to manage complexity and resource allocation, not to negate the fundamental safety requirement. The other options are incorrect because they misrepresent the purpose or outcome of ASIL decomposition. Assigning a new, unrelated safety goal would bypass the decomposition logic. Eliminating the safety goal entirely would be a direct violation of functional safety principles. Focusing solely on the ASIL of the decomposed elements without acknowledging the parent safety goal would lead to an incomplete safety strategy.

The core of this question lies in understanding the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) decomposition and the resulting safety goals. ASIL decomposition, as defined in ISO 26262, allows for the reduction of the ASIL of a component if it is implemented with sufficient independence from other components that might cause a common cause failure. However, the safety goals themselves, which are derived from the hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA), are not directly altered by ASIL decomposition. The decomposition impacts the *requirements* allocated to the decomposed elements, not the fundamental safety objectives. Therefore, if a system has a safety goal of ASIL D, and a component responsible for fulfilling a part of that goal is decomposed to ASIL B due to independence, the original safety goal remains ASIL D. The decomposition means that the ASIL B component, along with other independent components (potentially also decomposed), collectively contribute to achieving the ASIL D safety goal. The safety goal’s ASIL is determined by the highest risk associated with the hazardous event it mitigates, and decomposition is a method to manage the complexity of achieving that goal, not to redefine the goal’s criticality.

The core of this question lies in understanding the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) decomposition and the resulting safety goals and requirements. When an ASIL is decomposed, the intention is to reduce the ASIL of a particular function or element by introducing safety mechanisms that mitigate potential failures. However, the decomposition process itself does not eliminate the need for safety goals and their associated requirements. The safety goals established for the original, higher ASIL function remain the benchmark for safety. The decomposition strategy aims to achieve these same safety goals, but through a different architectural or design approach, potentially with lower ASILs assigned to individual decomposed elements. Therefore, the safety goals derived from the original hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA) are still the fundamental objectives that the decomposed system must satisfy. The decomposition influences how these goals are achieved and verified, but not the goals themselves. The safety requirements are then derived to ensure these safety goals are met, considering the ASILs of the decomposed elements and the effectiveness of the safety mechanisms.

The core of functional safety development, as delineated by ISO 26262, involves a systematic approach to hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA). This process is foundational for determining the necessary safety measures and the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) for each item. The ASIL is derived from three key parameters: Severity (S), Exposure (E), and Controllability (C). Severity assesses the potential harm to individuals in the event of a malfunction. Exposure evaluates the likelihood of the operational situation occurring that could lead to harm. Controllability measures the driver’s ability to avoid the hazardous event or mitigate its consequences. The ASIL is determined by combining these three factors using a predefined matrix. For instance, a high severity, high exposure, and low controllability would typically result in a higher ASIL (e.g., ASIL D), necessitating more stringent safety measures. Conversely, low severity, low exposure, and high controllability would lead to a lower ASIL (e.g., QM or ASIL A). The objective is to ensure that the residual risk is acceptable. Therefore, understanding how these three parameters interact to define the ASIL is crucial for correctly applying the standard. The question probes this fundamental relationship by asking which combination of these parameters would mandate the most rigorous safety development process.

The core of determining the appropriate safety activities for a given ASIL is the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA). The HARA process systematically identifies potential hazards, assesses their severity, exposure, and controllability, and assigns an Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) to each hazardous event. The ASIL is a risk classification from QM (Quality Management) to ASIL D, with ASIL D representing the highest level of risk and therefore requiring the most stringent safety measures. ISO 26262:2018, specifically in Part 3, outlines the HARA process and the ASIL determination. The ASIL is not directly derived from a single parameter but is a combination of the severity of potential harm, the probability of the operational situation occurring (exposure), and the likelihood of the driver or other road users being able to avoid the harm (controllability). For instance, a hazard with high severity, high exposure, and low controllability would result in a higher ASIL. The selection of safety goals and their associated ASILs directly influences the subsequent safety lifecycle activities, including the choice of methods and measures for concept phase, system development, hardware development, and software development. Therefore, the ASIL assigned to a safety goal is the primary driver for the rigor of the safety activities performed throughout the product development lifecycle.

The core of this question lies in understanding the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) decomposition and the resulting safety goals. ASIL decomposition, as defined in ISO 26262, allows for the reduction of the ASIL of a component or element if it is sufficiently independent from other elements that could violate the safety goal. However, the decomposition itself does not eliminate the need for safety mechanisms to achieve the original safety goal. The safety goal remains the overarching objective. When ASIL decomposition is applied, the decomposed elements must collectively satisfy the safety requirements derived from the original safety goal. Therefore, the safety goal itself is not altered by the decomposition process; rather, the ASIL assigned to the individual elements that contribute to achieving that goal is adjusted. The safety goal is a high-level statement of the desired safety outcome, and decomposition is a method to manage the complexity and ASIL of lower-level elements while still ensuring the overall safety objective is met. The safety goal’s integrity level is fundamentally tied to the hazard it mitigates, and decomposition is a strategy for implementation, not a change to the hazard itself.

The core of this question lies in understanding the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) decomposition and the resulting safety goals and requirements. When an ASIL is decomposed, the original ASIL is typically reduced for the sub-elements. For instance, if a system with ASIL D is decomposed into two independent sub-systems, each might be assigned ASIL B. However, the safety goals and requirements derived from the original ASIL D must still be met by the *combination* of these sub-systems. This means that while the individual sub-systems may have a lower ASIL, the overall functional safety concept must ensure that the original safety objectives are achieved. The correct approach involves ensuring that the safety requirements allocated to the decomposed elements, when integrated, collectively satisfy the original safety goals. This often means that the safety requirements for the decomposed elements are not simply a direct reduction of the original ASIL D requirements but are carefully crafted to ensure the overall safety integrity. The other options represent misinterpretations of ASIL decomposition, such as assuming a direct linear reduction of all safety requirements without considering the combined effect, or incorrectly applying the decomposition to elements that are not sufficiently independent. The principle is that decomposition allows for a more manageable development process for individual components, but the overarching safety argument for the system remains paramount.

The core of this question revolves around the concept of the Safety Element out of Context (SEooC) and its relationship with the Item Definition and the subsequent confirmation measures required when integrating a SEooC into a specific vehicle project. A SEooC is developed without a specific vehicle application in mind, meaning its safety case and validation are performed independently. When this SEooC is then integrated into a new vehicle project (the “target vehicle”), the vehicle manufacturer (or integrator) must perform confirmation measures to ensure the SEooC’s safety goals are still met within the new system context. These confirmation measures are crucial because the operational situation and interaction with other elements in the target vehicle might introduce new hazards or affect the SEooC’s behavior in ways not considered during its initial development.

According to ISO 26262:2018, Part 10, Clause 6, confirmation measures are necessary to demonstrate that the safety requirements of the SEooC are satisfied in the context of the target vehicle. This involves verifying that the assumptions made during the SEooC’s development regarding its operating environment and interactions are still valid. If the target vehicle’s context deviates significantly from these assumptions, additional safety analyses and validation activities might be required for the SEooC, or even modifications to the SEooC itself. The confirmation measures are not about re-developing the SEooC but about ensuring its safe integration and operation within the specific vehicle system. Therefore, the most appropriate action is to perform confirmation measures to validate the SEooC’s suitability and safety in the new context.

The core of this question lies in understanding the relationship between the ASIL (Automotive Safety Integrity Level) decomposition and the resulting ASIL of the decomposed element. When an ASIL C function is decomposed into two independent elements, and one element is assigned ASIL B and the other is assigned ASIL A, the ASIL of the original function is determined by the highest ASIL of the decomposed elements. In this scenario, the highest ASIL assigned to a decomposed element is ASIL B. Therefore, the decomposed system, when considered as a whole for the purpose of demonstrating the effectiveness of the decomposition, must still meet the requirements equivalent to the original ASIL C, but this is achieved through the combination of ASIL B and ASIL A elements. However, the question asks about the ASIL *of the decomposed element itself* that is responsible for the highest safety goal contribution after decomposition. When an ASIL C function is decomposed, the intention is to reduce the complexity or implement specific safety mechanisms at a lower ASIL. If the decomposition results in one element being ASIL B and another ASIL A, the element with ASIL B is the one that carries the higher safety burden from the original ASIL C function. The standard dictates that if a safety goal with ASIL C is decomposed into two elements, one with ASIL B and one with ASIL A, the ASIL of the decomposed elements are B and A respectively. The overall safety goal’s ASIL remains C, but the implementation strategy involves these lower ASIL components. The question specifically asks for the ASIL of the *decomposed element* that retains the highest safety integrity requirement after the decomposition process, which is ASIL B. The decomposition process itself doesn’t magically lower the inherent safety requirement of the original function; it distributes it. The element that receives the higher portion of that requirement is the one with the higher ASIL.

The correct approach involves understanding the fundamental principles of fault tolerance and diagnostic coverage as defined within ISO 26262. Specifically, Part 5 (Product development at the hardware level) and Part 10 (Guideline on ISO 26262) are crucial. The question probes the relationship between the diagnostic coverage of a safety mechanism and its ability to achieve a target ASIL. A safety mechanism with a diagnostic coverage of 99% for single-point faults and 90% for latent faults, when applied to a hardware component with a high ASIL (e.g., ASIL D), is being evaluated for its effectiveness in reducing the probability of hazardous events. The calculation of the residual failure probability is key. For ASIL D, the target for the probability of hazardous events due to random hardware failures is less than \(10^{-8}\) per hour. Diagnostic coverage directly impacts this by detecting and mitigating faults. A diagnostic coverage of 99% for single-point faults means that \(1-0.99 = 0.01\) of single-point faults remain undetected. A diagnostic coverage of 90% for latent faults means \(1-0.90 = 0.10\) of latent faults remain undetected. The effectiveness of the safety mechanism in achieving the ASIL D target depends on its ability to reduce the overall failure rate to the required level. While the exact calculation of the residual failure rate requires knowing the underlying failure rates of the component and the specific diagnostic mechanisms, the question tests the understanding that high diagnostic coverage is essential for high ASILs. The concept being tested is that achieving ASIL D necessitates extremely high diagnostic coverage for both single-point and latent faults to ensure the probability of hazardous events remains below the stringent threshold. Therefore, a safety mechanism with these specific diagnostic coverage figures, while good, might still fall short of the requirements for ASIL D if the underlying component failure rates are high, or if the diagnostic mechanisms themselves have limitations not explicitly stated. The most accurate statement reflects the necessity of robust diagnostics for high ASILs.

The core of this question lies in understanding the relationship between the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) decomposition and the resulting safety goals and their associated ASILs. When an ASIL C safety goal is decomposed into two independent elements, and one element is assigned ASIL A, the other element must retain a sufficient ASIL to ensure the overall safety goal is met. ISO 26262:2018, specifically Part 9, Clause 6, discusses ASIL decomposition. If a safety goal with ASIL C is decomposed, and one part is ASIL A, the remaining part must be ASIL B to maintain the original ASIL C integrity. This is because the combination of ASIL A and ASIL B, when considered in a fault-tolerant manner (assuming independence), does not achieve the rigor of ASIL C. The decomposition process aims to reduce the complexity or cost of implementing safety mechanisms by distributing the safety requirements. However, the sum of the decomposed ASILs, in terms of their risk reduction capabilities, must at least match the original ASIL. ASIL B provides a higher level of risk reduction than ASIL A, and when combined, they can effectively contribute to meeting the ASIL C requirement of the parent safety goal. Therefore, the remaining element must be ASIL B.